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Abstract
Essays on Wealth Inequality and Asset Pricing
by
Georgios Koimisis
Adviser: Professor Christos I. Giannikos
Economic and financial theories are often found to be in conflict with empirical evidence,
suggesting revisions and elaborations of existing models. There are usually many revisions
proposed in response to these ”puzzles”, but often the true resolution may be a factor not
yet realized. This dissertation consists of three chapters and contributes to the explanation
of a persistent and significant anomaly, the equity premium puzzle, by taking into account
the implications of wealth inequality on consumer preferences and, consequently, on asset
prices.
The first chapter examines how wealth inequality affects asset prices in a complete market
setting. Wealth inequality is introduced through a mean preserving transfer of endowment.
This creates the departure from an egalitarian distribution of wealth. It seems that wealth
inequality is important to explain fluctuations in asset prices, as long as durability of the
good and habit forming preferences of agents are considered.
The second chapter studies the relationship between wealth inequality and asset pricing
in both complete and incomplete markets. To this end, we examine how wealth inequality
affects the equilibrium level of the return on equity, the risk free rate and, consequently,
the equity premium, in an exchange economy with identical agents, except for their initial
endowment. The novelty of our approach is that (i) we incorporate a single durable good and
habit forming preferences of agents and (ii) calibrate our model with updated data on wealth
inequality. For our calibrations we introduce two equally weighted classes and three unequally
iv
weighted classes of wealth. We also explore the effects of the addition of an non-hedgeable
labor income risk, which creates an element of market incompleteness to our model. The
following results are documented: In complete markets, and under certain conditions, wealth
inequality can drive the equity premium up to its historically observed levels, when there is
a single durable good or the agents exhibit internal habit persistence with substitutability
of consumption. In incomplete markets, the presence of a larger background risk is required
to drive the equity premium down, when good is durable or when agents exhibit internal
habit persistence and a lower level of background risk is required when agents have external
habits.
The third chapter investigates the implications of wealth inequality on prices of durable
assets in an economy with Epstein Zin preferences of agents. Wealth inequality does not affect
asset prices in fully insurable markets but has an important effect in incomplete markets.
When agents have a stronger preference for resolution of uncertainty, durability decreases
the equity premium, while, for agents with a weaker preference for resolution of uncertainty,
a durable good increases the equity premium. Furthermore, departing from an egalitarian
economy can even cause a reduction of the equity risk premium. Questions are raised about
the level of background risk, required to decrease the equity premium in the unequal economy.
v
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Chapter 1
Wealth Inequality and Asset Pricing with Durability
and Habit Formation
1.1 Introduction
The study of financial economics has evolved over the past years, playing a significant role in
the fields of asset pricing and economics of uncertainty. An extensive body of literature has
been developed and revolves around the stochastic discount factor, also known as pricing
kernel: E(m̃x̃i) = πi. The pricing kernel reflects the fact that the price of an asset can
be computed by “discounting” the future cash flow x̃i by the stochastic factor m̃ and then
taking the expectation. It is obvious that the stochastic discount factor m̃ is significant to
explain asset prices.
Over the last one hundred years, the average real return to shocks in the United States has
been about 6% per year higher than that of Treasury Bills. At the same time, the average
real return on Treasury Bills has been about 1% per year. Equity premium puzzle and
risk free rate puzzle are still considered “mysteries” that require further specification and
explanation, as there has not been a benchmark case model to explain them.
The present article studies the following important research questions: Does the wealth
1
distribution affect asset pricing in an economy with a single durable good? Does the wealth
distribution affect asset pricing in an economy with habit formation? Intuitively, it seems
that it does: as the rich get richer, they buy assets that are more durable and drive up prices
in each state. The same can be said for agents that form habits in their consumption. Habit
persistence has a different effect on different types of agents, even if it is homogeneous across
agents. To understand why this happens, consider an economy consisting of individuals
with different attitudes towards risk or beliefs about future dividends. In this economy,
equilibrium risk premia and prices balance the agents’ preferences and beliefs. If wealth
shifts into the hands of the less risk averse or the optimistic, for markets to clear, prices
of risky assets must rise and risk premiums must fall to counterbalance the new demand of
these agents.
We discuss the implications of wealth inequality on equity premium and on risk free rate,
by departing from time separability. The aim of this study is to provide explanations for
the relationship between wealth distribution and (i) asset pricing, (ii) the heterogeneity of
consumers’ wealth, (iii) the nature of the good and (iv) habit persistence. It seems that
wealth inequality affects both the equity premium and the risk free rate. We implement
wealth inequality under a simple Arrow-Debreu1 exchange economy with identical agents
that live only two periods2. Wealth inequality is introduced with a mean-preserving transfer
of endowment3. This creates the departure from an egalitarian distribution of wealth.
We start our theoretical specification by introducing a single durable good in the economy,
instead of a perishable good. The motivation for studying the durability effects on a CCAPM
1The Arrow – Debreu model suggests that under certain economic assumptions (convex preferences,
perfect competition, and demand independence) there must be a set of prices such that aggregate supplies
will equal aggregate demands for every commodity in the economy.
2A two-period model can be thought of as a metaphor either of the present vs. the future of a long lived
consumer with alternating high and low income subject to borrowing constraints (Woodford, 1996).
3Mean Preserving Spread Theorem: Let FA(x̃) and FB(x̃) be two distribution functions defined on the
same state space with identical means. If this is true, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) FA(x̃)SSDFB(x̃), (ii) FB(x̃) is a mean preserving spread of FA(x̃) according to x̃B = x̃A + z. For the
proof see Rothchild and Stiglitz (1970).
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model rests on the fact that, since the high volatility of durable goods purchases constitutes
an important macroeconomic stylized fact (Baxter, 1996), there is reason to expect that this
volatility may impact financial phenomena as well (Donaldson and Giannikos, 2003). We
demonstrate that durability may increase asset risk premia under certain conditions; hence,
it may help in the resolution the equity premium puzzle, under different wealth distributions.
It seems that a durable good affects the price at state s. Consequently, the pricing kernel,
which is a function of both the growth of the consumption and the level of durability of the
good, also is affected. Substantial modifications in the behavior of equilibrium commodity
prices, asset and interest rates are recorded when the constraint on consumption of the
durable good is active. Effects of changes in durability on equilibrium prices are assessed.
Furthermore, the risk free rate is affected by the durability of the good. As a result, the
equity premium is also affected.
Our second modification includes habit persistence when different wealth distributions are
present. Habit formation models have become increasingly important in explaining a number
of dynamic asset pricing, such as the equity premium puzzle, as well as macroeconomic facts,
such as the response of consumption to monetary shocks and savings and growth. For our
analysis, we consider internal and external habit formation. The difference between the two
habit types lies in the effect that today’s consumption has on future habit. Abel (1990) and
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) study models where habit formation is exogenous. That is,
past consumption enters the habit process but without affecting the current consumption
choice. Dunn and Singleton (1986), Constantinides (1990) and Detemple and Zapatero
(1991) introduce models with internal habit. That is, past consumption choice enters the
habit process and has an effect on both current and future consumption choices. As a result,
the two types of habit persistence produce different stochastic discount factors and might
lead to asset pricing implications. As a result of our analysis, it seems that wealth inequality
produces also different equity premia and risk free rates for different types and different levels
3
of habit formation. Several different specifications are considered throughout our study.
The rest of the article is as follows: Section 2 provides a comprehensive literature review.
Section 3 discusses the theoretical model, the methodology and results for each formulation
of the model. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The seminal consumption-based asset pricing study by Lucas (1978) derived and tested
analytic relationships between the marginal rate of substitution of a representative agent
(with standard preferences) and asset prices, but failed to explain sufficiently the fluctuations
of asset prices in the economy. This model did not allow for agent heterogeneity, however
agent heterogeneity is likely to matter even if a representative agent exists.
In Constantinides’ (1982) model markets are complete and agents have either identical but
non-homothetic preferences or heterogeneous CRRA preferences. Heterogeneous consumers
are able to equalize their marginal rates of substitution across states and across time and
the equilibrium of this heterogeneous-agent economy can be duplicated by the equilibrium
in a Lucas economy with a representative agent. Optimality of the competitive equilibrium
implies that production, prices and aggregate consumption are the same as in the equilibrium
of a central planner. Furthermore, the wealth distribution in an heterogeneous economy
becomes a redundant state variable.
Grossman and Shiller (1981) collect US data for the period 1889-1978 and evaluate several
sample moments for the growth rate of real consumption per capita (mean, standard devi-
ation, first order autocorrelation) and for the returns of risky assets, risk-free assets (mean
and standard deviations) and the equity risk premium.
In 1985, Mehra and Prescott describe a particular empirical problem. They make use of
the same data as Shiller and Grossman’s and employ a variation of Lucas pure exchange
model, under the condition that the growth rate for endowments follows a two-state Markov
4
process, with a symmetrical transition matrix. After comparing the sample moments (mean,
standard deviation and first order autocorrelation) of the real consumption per capita growth
rate to their model, they find a striking result: the average returns on equity, risk-free assets
and risk premium do not match the respective actual values from the sample and specifically,
the predicted equity premium is too low and the predicted risk free rate is too high, given the
observed low variability of consumption growth. This forms the “Equity Premium Puzzle”, as
is known in literature. As Kocherlakota (1996) states in his comprehensive literature survey:
“in a quantitative sense, stocks are not sufficiently riskier than Treasury Bills to explain
the spread in their returns”. In terms of their model and in analogy to Lucas’ exchange
economy (1978), Mehra and Prescott justify the use of a representative agent problem, by
considering an environment with frictionless, complete markets and preferences that display
linear absolute risk tolerance or hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA).
Weil (1989) shows that although individuals are highly risk averse (i.e. they have a preference
for consumption smoothing), and although the risk free rate is very low, they still save enough
so that per capita consumption grows rapidly, although it seems from standard models
of preferences that they dislike growth. He shows that the standard asset pricing model
performs bad not only in the prediction of the equity premium, but also in the prediction of
the risk free rate. This puzzle is known in literature as “Risk Free Rate Puzzle”. By using
Shiller’s data (the same as in the Mehra and Prescott’s model) the observed risk free rate is
around 1%, while the calibration of the model shows a predicted risk free rate of around 4%
per year.
Several attempts have been made to reconcile the traditional asset pricing puzzles. Two
interesting ways that have been proposed are habit formation (or adjacent complementarity
in consumption) and durability of goods. Both of these tools have opposing effects, in that
habit persistence tends to make certain lag coefficients in the Euler equation negative while
durability tends to reverse their signs.
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Abel (1990) introduces a utility function that nests three classes of utility functions and
incorporates it into a canonical Lucas (1978) tree model, in order to examine the Equity
Premium Puzzle. The three classes of utility functions are (i) time separable utility functions,
(ii) “Catching up with the Joneses” utility functions, which depends on the consumer’s level
of consumption relative to the lagged cross-sectional average level of consumption and (iii)
utility functions that display habit persistence.
Constantinides (1990) also relaxes the assumption of time separability of preferences and
allows for habit persistence in a representative agent model. According to his results, habit
persistence drives a wedge between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the inverse
of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. In that way, the equity premium
puzzle is resolved, by showing that habit formation generates the sample mean and variance
of the consumption growth rate with low risk aversion.
The article by Detemple and Zapatero (1991) is another example of habit formation liter-
ature. Furthermore, it relies on the exponentially smoothed habit index of Constantinides
(1990). The authors analyze asset prices in an exchange economy in which the representa-
tive agent’s preferences exhibit habit persistence. Their analysis shows that consumption
smoothing may be obtained even when the interest rate is stochastic and provides new
testable restrictions on the behavior of financial assets.
The study of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is another representative example of the habit
formation literature. Campbell and Cochrane try to resolve the equity premium puzzle by
modifying the standard representative-agent consumption-based asset pricing model, by in-
troducing a time-varying subsistence level to the power utility function. As the consumption
decreases toward the slow-moving habit, the curvature of the utility function rises, thus risky
asset prices decline and expected returns rise. Their habit specification has three distinctive
features. First, it is external as in the case of Abel’s (1990). Second, it moves slowly in
response to consumption, in contrast to empirical specifications in which each period’s habit
6
is proportional to last period’s consumption (Ferson and Constantinides, 1991). Third, habit
adapts non-linearly to the history of consumption, so that habit is always below consumption
and marginal utility is always finite and positive.
An alternative approach that could explain the anomalies observed in the data is to aban-
don the complete markets assumption, while maintaining HARA preferences. The puzzles
become less “puzzling” with the properties of models with frictions in the form of borrow-
ing constraints, transaction costs, and uninsurable labor income risk. Moreover, incomplete
markets arising from uninsurable labor income shocks, borrowing constraints, and trading
costs have been suggested as the reason for the empirical failure of the representative agent
model.
Weil (1992) shows that the introduction of an undiversifiable labor income risk at the repre-
sentative CRRA model is appropriate for the solution of the Risk Free Rate Puzzle. In the
presence of a precautionary saving motive, a representative agent model which hypothesizes
that insurance markets are complete underestimates private savings, and thus overestimates
equilibrium returns. Furthermore, the sign of the ‘bias’ on the equity premium introduced by
miscalibration cannot be determined from risk aversion and precationary saving alone. Thus,
uninsurable labor risk can provide a solution in this case: to tell into which direction one is
misled by the representative agent assumption when there is idiosyncratic labor income risk,
it is necessary to know how consumers’ attitudes towards dividend risk are affected by the
existence of background uninsurable labor income risk.
Heaton and Lucas (1996) is another prominent example of this approach. Their calibration
results suggest that incomplete markets, along with the presence of transaction costs can
justify for the low risk free rate and under some conditions can explain the equity premium.
They examine an infinite periods’ setting, calibrated according to US data on individual
uninsurable labor income and find that the difference between the complete markets interest
rate and the incomplete markets interest rate is small.
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Constantinides and Duffie (1996) relax the complete market assumption and explore if het-
erogeneous consumers and incomplete markets can explain the equity premium and the risk
free rate puzzles. According to their results, when shocks to individual labor income are per-
manent and labor markets are incomplete, rather than transitory, as in the case of Heaton
and Lucas (1996), then a much lower risk free rate can be generated, in contrast with the
case of complete markets.
At the same time, incomplete markets introduces a role for the wealth distribution in the
determination of asset prices. Krusell and Smith (1997) study a rich class of neoclassical
production economies with incomplete insurance markets for idiosyncratic risk and income,
wealth and preferences heterogeneity. Specifically, they consider a calibrated version of the
stochastic growth model with a large number of agents who face idiosyncratic labor income
shocks, which cannot be insured directly. Their model generates an endogenous wealth
distribution across agents. The representative agent model is unrealistic in their case, so
they add the assumption of preference heterogeneity in their incomplete markets setting.
An important study on the effect of wealth inequality on a standard asset pricing model has
been conducted by Gollier (2001). Gollier examines how wealth inequality affects the equity
premium and the risk free rate under a few assumptions: by using a representative agent
model (identical preferences) and by abandoning the assumption of a linear absolute risk
tolerance (no HARA preferences). With HARA preferences and complete markets, wealth
inequality has no effect on asset pricing. He also shows in a two-period setup that when
the absolute risk tolerance (ART) is concave, the equity premium in an unequal economy
is larger than the equity premium obtained in an egalitarian economy. As he points out,
the representative agent preferences will in general be dependent on wealth inequality. Even
with complete markets, the preferences of the representative agent are typically nonstandard
when individual utilities do not reside within quite particular classes. From calibrations, he
discovers that the effect of wealth inequality on equity premium is small.
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The behavior of a durable product has been studied extensively over time, by academics.
Durable goods reflect an element of standard of living that may not be captured by current
spending (as people buy them infrequently). Thus, a way to measure wealth inequality is
to look at what happens in the risk premium and the risk free rate when the agents hold
durable goods. Furthermore, quality of a durable good can also play a substantial role for
the welfare consequences of inequality.
Most of the related literature examines the effect of market structure on the behavior of a
durable good. Swan (1970) shows that when durability depends on both the length of life
and the deterioration rate of the good, the optimal degree of durability for the monopoly
is identical with the competitive market. Levhari and Peles (1973) analyze the effects of
market structure on the quality and durability of goods produced and try to find the impact
of government regulation on these variables.
Abel (1983) derives general conditions for the independence of the optimal level of durability
from the level of output which is different for the monopolist and the competitor. Muller
and Peles (1988) argue that the relationship between market structure (monopoly or perfect
competition) and durability is not independent when the constant returns to scale assumption
is dropped. In addition, they show that the total amount of service a good produces is a
measure of durability that is consistent across the decay methods (exponential decay and
one-hoss-shay).
Giannikos (1992) shows that durability may simultaneously increase the size of asset risk
premia and decrease the level of risk free rate. Detemple and Giannikos (1996) show that
when the durable goods’ attributes are perfect substitutes, irreversibility of the durable’s
purchases may cause temporary excesses of actual services over their desired level. In that
way, the incorporation of durable goods into an asset pricing model seems to have an im-
portant contribution on the explanation of the Equity Premium or Risk Free Rate puzzles.
Baxter (1996) develops a two-sector neoclassical model and studies the interaction between
9
consumer durables and business cycles. While her model performs well along the dimension
of relative aggregate volatility, she finds that the characteristics of the impulse response to a
durable goods demand shock are counterfactual. Lastly, Ferson and Constantinides (1991)
examine in a dynamic CCAPM whether habit formation or durability can help explain-
ing return data. According to their results, habit persistence has a dominant effect over
durability.
In our study, we introduce wealth inequality into an Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with
a single durable good and agents with habit forming preferences. We examine the effect
of wealth inequality on the equity risk premium. Our results suggest that durable goods’
attributes and habit persistence can effectively contribute to the asset pricing literature when
wealth distribution is present.
1.3 Theoretical Model and Methodology
1.3.1 Preferences
We begin with the assumption that the preferences of the agents with respect to random
payoffs satisfy the continuity and independence axioms and therefore can be represented
by a von Neumann Morgenstern (VNM) expected utility function. The utility function is
denoted by u(C) and is increasing (u′(C) > 0) and concave (u′′(C) < 0) . The concavity of
the utility function implies that agents are risk averse.
a. Coefficients of Risk Aversion
For the degree of risk aversion, we use the following two measures: the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion α(C), and the coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ(C) , at a level of consumption
C. The α(C) measures the magnitude of the premium (up to a constant of proportionality)
that agents are willing to pay at a given consumption level C, in order to avoid a “small”
gamble with zero mean and payoff levels unrelated to C. The coefficient of absolute risk
10




The second derivative of the utility function measures its concavity. Dividing by the first
derivative eliminates the dependence on the arbitrary scaling of the utility – that is, the
α(C) is unaffected by a monotone affine transformation of the utility function. Therefore,
it depends on the preferences, not on the particular utility function that represents the
preferences. For any risk averse investor α(C) ≥ 0, because concavity implies u′′(C) < 0 .
A high value of α indicates a high curvature of the utility function and that implies high
risk aversion to risk. The ρ(C) measures the magnitude of the premium (up to a constant
of proportionality) that agents are willing to pay at a given consumption level C to avoid
a “small” gamble with zero mean, but with payoff levels that are proportional to C. The











Because risk can be shared among investors, the aggregate risk tolerance in the economy
is frequently important. If there are n investors with coefficients of absolute risk aversion
αn and coefficients of risk tolerance τn =
1
αn
, then the aggregate risk tolerance is defined as∑n





This is equal to the harmonic mean of the absolute risk aversion coefficients divided by n.
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b. Types of Risk Aversion
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA)
The agent has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) if the ARA is constant at every wealth
level. Every CARA utility function is a monotone affine transform of the utility function
u(C) = −e−bC
where b is a constant and equal to the ARA. The above equation is known as exponential
utility. Wealth effects are absent from a CARA type of utility, which means that the risk
premium is independent of wealth.
The exponential utility exhibits linear risk tolerance (LRT): τ(C) = 1
b
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
When the RRA is not changing for every different level of wealth, then the utility function
of an agent exhibits Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). Any monotone CRRA utility
function is a monotone affine transformation of the following functions:
i. Logarithmic utility: (a = 1)
ii. Power Utility: (0 < a 6= 1) where a is the coefficient of RRA, a positive constant different
from 1. Higher values of a are associated with higher levels of risk aversion. The logarithmic
utility function exhibits linear risk tolerance: τ(C) = C. The power utility exhibits linear




Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA)
The Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) utility function summarizes several members








such that η + C
γ
> 0.
It exhibits linear tolerance in wealth: τ(C) = η + C
γ
.
1.3.2 Description of the economy with a single durable good
We consider a simple Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with a single type of asset. There
is a large number of n agents, who live for two periods, ”today” and the ”future”. These
periods are indexed by t = 0 and t = 1 respectively. At date t = 0 there is uncertainty about
the state of the world that will prevail at t = 1. At the beginning of t = 0, each agent is
endowed with a single durable good, that supplies some kind of service.
Let us call this good ”corn”. Corn can be either consumed immediately, or it can be preserved
to be used in other ways in the future. Let us assume that planting j units of corn today
yields f(j) units of seed in the future. We assume that function is increasing and concave and
that f(0) = 0. The derivative of f is the marginal productivity of capital, which is therefore
assumed to be positive and decreasing. The good is characterized by a depreciation rate
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 , and is homogeneous across agents. For δ = 1 , the good is perishable. The
decay method is one-hoss-shay4. The durability of the good is inserted through an exogenous
process into the budget constraint.
At this point, it is necessary to determine how the agents should allocate their initial en-
dowment of the good between immediate consumption and saving/investment for the future.
4The durable good delivers the same services throughout its lifetime before failing with zero scrap value.
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To keep the model simple, let us assume that all agents have identical preferences, repre-
sented by the rate of pure time preference β. They also have the same attitude towards risk
and consumption smoothing over time. The economy is characterized by the von Neuman-
Morgenstern utility function u on consumption at each period. It is well known that the
standard VNM (or expected) preferences exhibit a strong interdependence between risk and
time preferences. This function is increasing (u′ > 0), twice continuously differentiable and
strictly concave (u′′ < 0). This implies that the marginal utility of the good in current and
future period is decreasing. The effect on welfare of one more seed of corn is larger when
the consumption level is low than when it is high. The concavity of u also implies that there
is a preference for consumption smoothing over time. The uncertainty is characterized by S
possible states of nature, indexed by s = 1, ...s, ...S5 and by the associated state probabilities
p1, ...ps.
Assume also a frictionless complete market for insurance and credit contracts that takes
place at t = 0 . Let π0 and π1 be the equilibrium prices to be paid at t = 0 for the delivery
of 1 unit of the good respectively at t = 0 and t = 1, conditional on state s6.
We price the durable good with a spot contract. The law of motion of the durable good
is Ds = (1 − δ)D0 + Cs, where Ds is the stock of durable good at state s and Cs are the
units of durable good at state s. In each subsequent state s = 1, ...s, ...S the good has
Ds = (1− δ)D0 + Cs.
At date 0, there is some inequality in the endowment for each agent, where wi0 is agent i’s
endowment of the single consumption good at that period. Agent i is also endowed with a
bundle of contingent claims (wi1, ..., wis, ..., wiS).
5State s = 0 designates period 0, rather than a possible state to occur at date t.
6We also assume a market for risk-free assets. A risk-free asset is a bundle containing exactly one unit of
each the Arrow-Debreu securities. The agent can borrow or lend non-contingent (riskless) assets that pay
1+r per unit on date 1 regardless of the state of nature, where r is the riskless real rate of interest. However,
in the complete markets’ case, as above, where Arrow securities exist for every state, the bond market is
redundant.
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is not constant in s, i.e. the income per capita in state s is random. The standard two-period








π0(Di0 − wi0) +
S∑
s=1
πs(Dis − wis) = 0, (1.2)
and
Dis = (1− δ)Di0 + Cis (1.3)
where β is the discount factor. Note that Di0 = Ci0. Let q0 =
1
β
and qs = ps for s =
1, . . . s, . . . S. The above problem can be transformed from a two-period savings portfolio
decision problem into a static problem under uncertainty in the following way: The standard









πs(Dis − wis) = 0 (1.5)
and
Dis = (1− δ)Di0 + Cis (1.6)
If all agents have the same preferences and the same endowments, there is no trade at
equilibrium. In our specification though, the endowment is unequally allocated, therefore
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some additional thought needs to be applied in order to define a ”representative agent”.
1.3.3 The Representative Agent problem
The first order conditions associated with equations (4)-(6) can be written as:
qsu
′(Dis) = λiπs, i = 1, . . . n, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (1.7)











wis, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (1.8)
The competitive equilibrium can be evaluated by this set of first order conditions (7) com-
bined with the market clearing conditions (8). The mutuality principle of Pareto efficient
allocations holds and implies that all diversifiable risks have been washed out of equilibrium7.
The mutuality principle means that the state-dependent variables Dis and πs depend on
state s through the level of wealth per capita zs. In other words, there exist functions Di
and v′ such that Dis = Di(zs) and πs = v
′(zs) for all s = 1, ...S.






, i = 1, ...n, s = 1, ...S, s′ = 1, ...S (1.9)
The equilibrium is characterized by the equalization across all agents of their marginal rate of
substitution of consumption for any pair of states. Equation (9) shows that the equilibrium
marginal rate of substitution is the same as in an economy in which all agents consume
the income per capita, zs , but where the utility function u is replaced by function v when
7Suppose for example that there are only two states, and the income levels per capita are the same in
the two states. This means that there is no aggregate risk in the economy. In this context, the mutuality
principle states that all agents are fully insured at equilibrium. Departing from this rule would force people
to face zero-mean risks, which because of risk aversion is a Pareto-inferior allocation.
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computing the ratio of marginal utility. Suppose that without loss of generality there exists






, i = 1, ...n, s = 1, ...S (1.10)
The marginal rates of substitution between consumption at current period and in any specific
state at future period are equalized across agents in equilibrium. The representative agent
exhibit preferences such that v(δ, zs) = π(δ, zs) for all z and let this function v referred to
as “representative agent utility function” from now on. The representative agent consumes
the income per capita in all states and at all dates. The asset prices in the an egalitarian
economy of n identical agents with utility function v would be exactly the same as in an
unequal economy.
The competitive equilibrium can be expressed by the following stochastic discount factor (or
pricing kernel) πs
qs
= π(δ, zs) and by a set of functions Di(.) such that Dis = Di(zs), for all i
and s. The pricing kernel can therefore be written as







As it seems the stochastic discount factor is a function of the agent i’s consumption and the
nature of the good. Clearly, this will have an effect on the equity premium and the risk free



































According to the above results, the risk carried by agent i at equilibrium is proportional to
his absolute risk tolerance (Wilson, 1968) and consequently, proportional to the decay rate













Di = z (1.15)
Wealth inequality is concentrated in its entirety in the vector Λ of lagrange multipliers. If
the endowment of each agent i is the same, the λi would be the same for every agent, i.e.
the equilibrium will be symmetric and v = u. As Gollier (2001) shows in his seminal pa-
per, when u belongs to the HARA utility functions, wealth distribution has no effect on
asset pricing. This result is not affected by the nature of the good, as it seems from our
analysis above. We can also write that when the agents exhibit HARA preferences and the
decay rate of the good increases (decreases), the absolute risk tolerance decreases (increases).
Proposition: The representative agent in an economy with a single durable good is at least
as tolerant to risk aversion as the representative agent in an economy with a single perishable
good.
Proof: Let t(y) = − v
′(y)
v′′(y)
denote the absolute risk tolerance of the representative agent at y.
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Then we can generalize for an economy with a single durable good as follows:






However, wealth inequality does not have an impact on equity premium when we have linear
absolute risk tolerance, even after we consider the nature of the good in the economy. Gollier
(2001) shows that, a necessary condition for the impact of different wealth distributions on
equity premium is to have a non-linear absolute risk tolerance. Wealth inequality increases
the equity premium when τ is concave, whereas it decreases it when τ is convex. We borrow
this result and extend it in an economy with a durable good.
1.3.4 The Equity Risk Premium and the Risk Free Rate
We now try to analyze the impact of wealth inequality on the equity premium and the risk









The risk free asset provides one unit of consumption good at t = 1 with probability 1. The


















where z0 is the current level of income per capita and z is the income per capita at the
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maturity of the gross risk free rate.
Calibrations
At this point, we estimate the effect of wealth inequality on equity premium, by considering
several cases of macroeconomic uncertainty. For starters, we assume as before a two-period
exchange economy with a representative agent (homogeneous preferences). We have date 0
(or t) and the subsequent date 1 (or t + 1), consisting of two states of the world. State 1
is defined as the recession state and state 2 is defined as the growth state. In state 1, the
consumption per capita is reduced by 1% (z1 = 0.99). In state 2 the consumption per capita
is increased by 6.32% (z2 = 1.0632).
Thus we can state that the income per capita is as follows:
z =

1, today with prob = 1.00000
0.99, future recession with prob = 0.61756
1.0632, future growth with prob = 0.38244

The mean and the variance of the growth rate of this economy are the same as those of
the U.S. economy for the period 1889-20168 and close to the empirical results of Mehra and
Prescott (1985) for non-durable goods, and Donaldson and Giannikos (2003) for durable
goods.
8Data are available after request.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Durable and Non-Durable Goods, United States Annual












Rs 0.0274 0.00104 0.00219
Rb 0.00104 0.00308 -0.000193
Ct/Ct−1 0.00219 -0.000193 0.00127
To estimate the relation between the index of absolute risk aversion and individual endow-
ment, we use the following specification (the agent index i is omitted for brevity), as used









where w denotes the lifetime endowment, H is a vector of consumer characteristics affecting
individual preferences, η is a random shock to preferences, and ξ, γ and b are unknown
parameters. The absolute risk aversion α(w) is always positive and decreasing in w for all
positive values of b. Furthermore, if b > 0 then a(w) is always convex in w
This empirical specification does not allow for heterogeneity in the b-parameter. If b varies
across individuals then estimates would be affected by heteroscedasticity. However, a formula
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the error term is homoscedastic (Guiso and Paiella,
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For b > 0 the ART is an increasing function of w. Moreover, it will be concave, linear or
convex in w, depending on whether b is less than, equal to, or greater than 1. Because b
measures the speed at which ρ(.) declines with endowment, it follows that τ(.) is a concave
(resp. convex) function of w if absolute risk aversion falls as consumption increases at a lower
speed (resp. greater) than 1, which is the value characterizing CRRA preferences. Although
the equation for RRA is assumed, a utility function that gives rise to a measure of absolute
















which converges to the power utility u(w) = w
1−r
1−r , as b tends to 1. If b, then r = ξexp[γH+η]
measures relative risk aversion. Taking logs on both sides of equation about tolerance, the
above empirical specification becomes
log τ = − log r + b logw = − log ξ − γH + b logw − η
The curvature of absolute risk tolerance – as well as the relation between absolute risk
aversion and endowment – is therefore parameterized by the value of b.














where r > 0.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is rz and becomes r for consumption level z = 1. The
ART is concave when b ∈ [0, 1] and convex for b > 1 . For b = 1, the utility exhibits CRRA.
For the following specifications we assume r = 2, as in Gollier (2001), which is reasonable.
We also assume a reasonable level of the discount factor β = 0.99, although as it will become
apparent later, the β does not enter the risk premium equation.
For our calibrations we consider a simple wealth distribution, with two equally weighted
classes, poor and rich, as in Heaton and Lucas (1996). The poor are endowed with a share
of 1− h of the GDP per capita in each state, and the rich are endowed with the rest 1 + h.
The parameter h is at the same time the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation
of the wealth distribution. Results are reported in Appendix 1.A.
Table A1 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk
premium Π, for four different specifications of the durable good and for four levels of wealth
distribution. The agents exhibit concave tolerance (b = 0.5).
In any level of wealth distribution, the equity premium is higher when the good is more
durable. However, a more durable good in a more unequal economy exhibits a higher equity
premium than in an egalitarian economy.
When the good has a decay rate of 0.1 and b = 0.5 (concave absolute risk tolerance), the
equity premium equals 0.83% in the egalitarian economy and increases to 1.15% when h
increases to 0.9. When the good has a decay rate of 0.5 and b = 0.5, the equity premium
equals 0.51% in the egalitarian economy and increases to 0.67% when h increases to 0.9.
When the good has a decay rate of 0.8 and b = 0.5, the equity premium equals 0.34% in
the egalitarian economy and increases to to 0.42% when h increases to 0.9. For a single
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perishable good (δ = 1) and concave absolute risk tolerance, the equity premium is 0.25%
in the egalitarian economy and increases marginally to 0.30% in the unequal economy.
[INSERT TABLE A1]
Table A2 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk
premium Π, for four different specifications of the durable good and for four levels of wealth
distribution, when the agents exhibit convex tolerance (b = 2.0).
In any level of wealth distribution, the equity premium is higher when the good is less durable
when the agents have convex ART. However, a more durable good in an egalitarian economy
exhibits a higher equity premium than in an unequal economy.
When the good has a decay rate of 0.1 and b = 2 (convex absolute risk tolerance), the equity
premium equals 0.17% in the egalitarian economy and reduces to 0% when h increases to
0.9. When the good has a decay rate of 0.5 and b = 2, the equity premium equals 0.21% in
the egalitarian economy and increases to 0% when h increases to 0.9. When the good has
a decay rate of 0.8 and b = 2, the equity premium equals 0.24% in the egalitarian economy
and increases to to 0.11% when h increases to 0.9. For a single perishable good (δ = 1) and
concave absolute risk tolerance, the equity premium is 0.24% in the egalitarian economy and
decreases to 0.13% in the unequal economy.
It is clear that the nature of the good, along with wealth distribution can play a key role
for the improvement of the calibrated equity premium. The higher durability, in combina-
tion with higher inequality and concave tolerance moves the equity premium up to 1.15%,
although it is still far from explaining the equity premium puzzle. On the other hand, when
the agents exhibit convex ART, they need a higher equity premium when the good is less




1.3.5 Introduction of Habit Formation
Research studies suggest that habits may play a key role in consumption behavior. In the
early dynamic theoretical models of habit persistence, the utility function takes the additive
form and is derived from the difference between current consumption and the habit stock.
The habit stock can take several different specifications.
In literature, the utility function, that is widely used for habit formation models, is of the
HARA form. The HARA utility has several attractive properties and some very unattractive
ones. For instance, it does not rule out negative consumption and it implies that poor and
rich agents reduce their consumption by exactly the same amount in reaction to a given risk
(Kimball, 1990; Carroll and Kimball, 1996). Thus, wealth inequality has no effect on asset
pricing for HARA habit forming preferences.
In our model we introduce habit-formation consumption into a consumption-saving model
with income uncertainty. We restrict our analysis to an economy with a single perishable









qs(Dis − wis) = 0 (1.22)
and
Dis = (1− δ)Di0 + Cis (1.23)
where Dis is the stock of the durable good at state s, Cis are the units of durable good at
state s and xis are habit levels.In the first period (state 0) the good has D0 = 1− δ. In each
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next state s = 1, ...s, ...S the good has Ds = (1− δ)D0 +Cs. For the purpose of our analysis
we assume a decay rate of 1, i.e. our good is perishable.
We consider internal and external habit formation preferences in the additive form, where
intratemporal utility is written over the difference between consumption and habit. Constan-
tinides (1990) studies internal habit formation preferences in the additive form, Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) study external habit models in the additive form and Abel (1990) stud-
ies both internal and external habits in the multiplicative setting. We assume the β discount
factor to be identical across all individuals.
External Habit Formation: External habit is defined as a function of per-capita contem-
poraneous consumption. Each agent is concerned with her current consumption relative to
that of others.
xis = εiDs, 0 < εi < 1




i=1Dis. Ds is treated as pure ex-
ternality in this context, because the sum of individual consumption equals the aggregate
endowment process, which is exogenous.





where 0 < Sis < 1.
In order for the representative agent to have finite utility, S must be a nonnegative process.
S can be interpreted as a business cycle indicator. In growth states, the surplus consumption
ratio is large and in recession states it is small.
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Internal Habit Formation: Internal habit is defined as a function of the agent’s specific
past consumption. Each agent is concerned with her prior consumption.
xis = εiDi0
where Di0 is the prior consumption of agent i. The habit stock xis is the investor’s habit.
If εi > 0, consumption at different time periods are complementary goods. By increasing
the current consumption, the investors habit increases in the future. Future marginal utility
is also increased. For εi < 0, consumption at different time periods are substitute goods.
By increasing the current consumption, the investors habit decreases in the future. Future
marginal utility is also reduced. In our model we assume nonnegative consumption and we
assume the habit stock xis to have the same sign as εi for every state s.
In both specifications, εi denotes the habit strength. For our analysis we will assume that
the habit factor is not agent specific, and therefore εi = ε.
When the consumption of agent i goes closer to the habit level xis, the curvature of the
utility function becomes time-varying (and therefore we have time-varying risk premia):




The competitive equilibrium satisfies the following set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
qsu










wis = zs, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (1.27)
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint of agent i.
In a economy with a representative agent, wealth inequality will have no effect on asset
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pricing, as long as the preferences are HARA, even after the introduction of habit formation.
The utility function of the representative agent has the following property: v̂′(z, x) = π(z, x),
for all z, where π(.) is the pricing kernel of the heterogeneous economy. Function v̂′ represents
the attitude towards risk and time of the heterogeneous economy as a whole, with habit
formation. Since markets are complete, a unique stochastic discount factor exists. In general,
the representative agent’s attitude has the following two properties: Let v̂ belong to the set
of utility functions with a HARA, such that



















As before, we consider the following simple wealth distribution, with two equally weighted
classes, poor and rich: the poor are endowed with a share of 1 − h of the GDP per capita
in each state, and the rich are endowed with the rest 1 + h. The parameter h is at the same
time the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of the wealth distribution. We
restrict our results to a single perishable good case (δ = 1).
[INSERT TABLE A3]
Table A3 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk
premium Π, for three specifications of the external habit and for four levels of wealth distri-
bution. The agents exhibit concave tolerance (b = 0.5). In any level of wealth distribution,
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the equity premium is higher when the external habit is weaker. However, a weaker habit in
a more unequal economy exhibits a higher equity premium than in an egalitarian economy.
When the preferences of the agents are exogenously habit formed with a weak habit strength
(0.1) and b = 0.5 (concave absolute risk tolerance), the equity premium equals 0.25% in the
egalitarian economy and increases to 0.30% when h increases to 0.9. For medium habit
strength (0.5) and b = 0.5, the equity premium equals 0.24% in the egalitarian economy and
increases to 0.28% when h increases to 0.9. For a stronger habit (0.8) and b = 0.5, the equity
premium equals 0.19% in the egalitarian economy and increases to 0.22% when h increases
to 0.9.
[INSERT TABLE A4]
Table A4 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk
premium Π, for three specifications of the external habit and for four levels of wealth distri-
bution when agents exhibit convex tolerance (b = 2.0). In any level of wealth distribution,
the equity premium is higher when the external habit is stronger. However, a stronger habit
in an egalitarian economy exhibits a higher equity premium than in an unequal economy.
When the preferences of the agents are exogenously habit formed with a weak habit strength
(0.1) and b = 2 (convex absolute risk tolerance), the equity premium equals 0.28% in the
egalitarian economy and decreases to 0.16% when h increases to 0.9. For medium habit
strength (0.5) and b = 2, the equity premium equals 0.65% in the egalitarian economy and
decreases to 0.36% when h increases to 0.9. For larger habit strength (0.8) and b = 2, the
equity premium equals 2.00% in the egalitarian economy and decreases to 1.12% when h
increases to 0.9.
As it becomes apparent, in the exogenous habit case, agents that exhibit stronger habits and
concave tolerance tend to require a lower equity risk premium. However, wealth inequality
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increases the equity premium. On the other hand agents that exhibit stronger habits and
convex tolerance tend to require a higher equity risk premium. In this case, wealth inequality
decreases the equity premium.
[INSERT TABLE A5]
For the rest of our analysis in internal habit formation, we consider substitutability between
consumption levels at different dates. Table A5 shows results for the return on equity Re, the
risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π, for three specifications of the internal habit
and for four levels of wealth distribution when agents exhibit concave tolerance (b = 0.5).
In any level of wealth distribution, the equity premium is higher when the internal habit
is stronger. Furthermore, a stronger habit in an unequal economy exhibits a higher equity
premium than in the egalitarian economy.
When the preferences of the agents are endogenously habit formed with a habit strength of
0.1 and b = 0.5 (concave absolute risk tolerance), the equity premium equals 0.32% in the
egalitarian economy and increases to 0.38% when h increases to 0.9. For habit strength of
0.5 and b = 0.5, the equity premium equals 0.61% in the egalitarian economy and increases
to 0.78% when h increases to 0.9. For habit strength of 0.8 and b = 0.5, the equity premium
equals 0.88% in the egalitarian economy and increases to 1.17% when h increases to 0.9.
[INSERT TABLE A6]
Table A6 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk
premium Π, for three specifications of the internal habit and for four levels of wealth distri-
bution when agents exhibit convex tolerance (b = 2.0). In any level of wealth distribution,
the equity premium is higher when the internal habit is weaker. Furthermore, a weaker habit
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in the egalitarian economy exhibits a higher equity premium than in any unequal economy.
When the preferences of the agents are endogenously habit formed with habit strength of
0.1 and b = 2 (convex absolute risk tolerance), the equity premium equals 0.26% in the
egalitarian economy and decreases to 0.13% when h increases to 0.9. For habit strength of
0.5 and b = 2, the equity premium equals 0.26% in the egalitarian economy and decreases
to 0.11% when h increases to 0.9. For habit strength of 0.8 and b = 2, the equity premium
equals 0.24% in the egalitarian economy and decreases to practically 0.00% when h increases
to 0.9.
As it seems, in the endogenous habit case, agents that exhibit stronger habits and concave
tolerance tend to require a higher equity risk premium. Also, wealth inequality increases the
equity premium. On the other hand agents that exhibit stronger habits and convex tolerance
tend to require a lower equity risk premium. In this case, wealth inequality decreases the
equity premium.
1.4 Conclusion
In an exchange economy with identical agents, except for their initial endowment, we examine
how wealth inequality affects the equilibrium level of the equity premium and the risk free
rate, when there is a single durable good and the agents’ preferences are habit forming. For
our calibrations we introduce two classes of wealth, in a simple two period model. When the
absolute risk tolerance is linear (as in the case of HARA preferences), wealth inequality has no
effect on asset pricing even after the introduction of habit persistence or durability. Wealth
inequality raises the equity premium when the good is durable and has a lower depreciation
rate, if and only if the absolute risk tolerance is concave. In the case of a convex absolute
risk tolerance, wealth inequality decreases the equity premium. However, in that case, the
predicted equity premium is higher when the good is less durable. The nature of the good
seems to play an important role in determining the equity premium under different level of
31
wealth distributions, as the improvement of the premium is not considered marginal, but
approaches the historically observed values when the agents exhibit concave tolerance and
the inequality of the economy is large.
We also consider habit persistence in two different specifications, external and internal.
The results are interesting in both forms of the model. Wealth inequality raises the equity
premium when agents exhibit exogenous habit persistence, if and only if the absolute risk
tolerance is concave. At the same time, a weak habit produces a higher equity premium
from a strong habit. Inc the case of a convex tolerance, wealth inequality decreases the
equity premium when agents’ preferences are exogenously habit formed. However, the pre-
dicted equity premium is closer to its historically observed value in that case, especially for
a strong habit in an egalitarian economy. For endogenous habit formed preferences, we con-
sider consumption levels with substitutability between different time periods. The predicted
equity premium is increased with wealth inequality when agents exhibit concave tolerance,
but in contrast with the exogenous habit formation case, a stronger habit requires a much
stronger premium. on the other hand, when agents exhibit convex tolerance, wealth inequal-




Table A1: Economy with concave tolerance and non existing habit persistence
δ = 0.1, ε = 0, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 3.7029 3.7756 4.0454 4.9307
Re 3.7112 3.7841 4.0546 4.9423
Premium 0.83% 0.85% 0.92% 1.15%
δ = 0.5, ε = 0, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 1.5507 1.5769 1.6727 1.9822
Re 1.5557 1.5821 1.6783 1.9888
Premium 0.51% 0.52% 0.55% 0.67%
δ = 0.8, ε = 0, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.5251 0.5324 0.5588 0.6403
Re 0.5285 0.5358 0.5624 0.6445
Premium 0.34% 0.34% 0.36% 0.42%
δ = 1, ε = 0, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.0438 0.0441 0.0454 0.0492
Re 0.0463 0.0467 0.0481 0.0521
Premium 0.25% 0.26% 0.27% 0.30%
? Table A1 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed by two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. Both types of agents have concave ART. We use four
different specifications conditionally to the degree of durability of the good for our results. We set ART concavity by using a
parameter of b = 0.5. We choose a relative risk aversion parameter of r = 2, which is reasonable. The parameter h is at the
same time the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of the wealth distribution. Parameter δ is the decay rate
of the good. For δ = 1 the good becomes perishable. Parameter varepsilon shows the habit strength. In all specifications
habit persistence is non existent. Four levels of wealth distributions are examined. The first column of each specification
shows the results for an egalitarian economy. Second, third and fourth columns are unequally distributed economies, with
the last one being the most unequal of all..
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Table A2: Economy with convex tolerance and non existing habit persistence
δ = 0.1, ε = 0, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 1.6264 1.4202 1.0439 0.7156
Re 1.6281 1.4216 1.0448 0.7162
Premium 0.17% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00%
δ = 0.5, ε = 0, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.9964 0.8839 0.6668 0.4720
Re 0.9985 0.8856 0.6680 0.4728
Premium 0.21% 0.18% 0.12% 0.00%
δ = 0.8, ε = 0, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.4413 0.3994 0.3098 0.2295
Re 0.4436 0.4015 0.3114 0.2306
Premium 0.24% 0.21% 0.15% 0.11%
δ = 1, ε = 0, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.0416 0.0412 0.0334 0.0279
Re 0.0440 0.0390 0.0352 0.0292
Premium 0.24% 0.22% 0.18% 0.13%
? Table A2 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed by two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. Both types of agents have convex ART. We use four
different specifications conditionally to the degree of durability of the good for our results. We set ART convexity by using
a parameter of b = 2.0. We choose a relative risk aversion parameter of r = 2, which is reasonable. The parameter h
is at the same time the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of the wealth distribution. Parameter δ is the
decay rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good becomes perishable. Parameter varepsilon shows the habit strength. In all
specifications habit persistence is non existent. Four levels of wealth distributions are examined. The first column of each
specification shows the results for an egalitarian economy. Second, third and fourth columns are unequally distributed
economies, with the last one being the most unequal of all..
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Table A3: Economy with a single perishable good, concave tolerance and external contem-
poraneous habit
δ = 1, ε = 0.1, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.0970 0.0973 0.0991 0.1024
Re 0.0995 0.0999 0.1018 0.1054
Premium 0.25% 0.25% 0.27% 0.30%
δ = 1, ε = 0.5, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.3791 0.3794 0.3807 0.3844
Re 0.3814 0.3818 0.3832 0.3872
Premium 0.24% 0.24% 0.25% 0.28%
δ = 1, ε = 0.8, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.7094 0.7097 0.7107 0.7137
Re 0.7113 0.7116 0.7127 0.7159
Premium 0.19% 0.19% 0.20% 0.22%
? Table A3 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed by two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. Both types of agents have concave ART. We use three
different specifications conditionally to the strength of external habit for our results. We set ART concavity by using a
parameter of b = 0.5. We choose a relative risk aversion parameter of r = 2, which is reasonable. The parameter h is at the
same time the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of the wealth distribution. Parameter δ is the decay rate
of the good. For all three specifications, we consider only a perishable good, hence δ = 1. Parameter varepsilon shows the
habit strength. Four levels of wealth distributions are examined. The first column of each specification shows the results
for an egalitarian economy. Second, third and fourth columns are unequally distributed economies, with the last one being
the most unequal of all..
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Table A4: Economy with a single perishable good, convex tolerance and external contempo-
raneous habit
δ = 1, ε = 0.1, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.0999 0.0967 0.0903 0.0840
Re 0.1027 0.0993 0.0924 0.0856
Premium 0.28% 0.26% 0.21% 0.16%
δ = 1, ε = 0.5, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.4324 0.4194 0.4110 0.3928
Re 0.4259 0.4254 0.4063 0.3964
Premium 0.65% 0.59% 0.47% 0.36%
δ = 1, ε = 0.8, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.8826 0.8710 0.8439 0.8129
Re 0.9026 0.8894 0.8587 0.8241
Premium 2.00% 1.84% 1.48% 1.12%
? Table A4 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed by two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. Both types of agents have convex ART. We use three
different specifications conditionally to the strength of external habit for our results. We set ART convexity by using a
parameter of b = 2.0. We choose a relative risk aversion parameter of r = 2, which is reasonable. The parameter h is at the
same time the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of the wealth distribution. Parameter δ is the decay rate
of the good. For all three specifications, we consider only a perishable good, hence δ = 1. Parameter varepsilon shows the
habit strength. Four levels of wealth distributions are examined. The first column of each specification shows the results
for an egalitarian economy. Second, third and fourth columns are unequally distributed economies, with the last one being
the most unequal of all..
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Table A5: Economy with a single perishable good, concave tolerance and internal habit with
substitutability of past and current consumption
δ = 1, |ε| = 0.1, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.3671 0.3707 0.3825 0.4201
Re 0.3702 0.3739 0.3858 0.4239
Premium 0.32% 0.32% 0.33% 0.38%
δ = 1, |ε| = 0.5, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 2.0557 2.0765 2.1708 2.4848
Re 2.0567 2.0826 2.1773 2.4926
Premium 0.61% 0.62% 0.65% 0.78%
δ = 1, |ε| = 0.8, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 3.8623 3.9188 4.1259 4.8215
Re 3.8711 3.9278 4.1356 4.8332
Premium 0.88% 0.90% 0.96% 1.17%
? Table A5 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed by two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. Both types of agents have concave ART. We use three
different specifications conditionally to the strength of internal habit for our results. and assume the past and current
consumption to be substitutes. We set ART concavity by using a parameter of b = 0.5 and choose a relative risk aversion
parameter of r = 2, which is reasonable. The parameter h is at the same time the standard deviation and the coefficient
of variation of the wealth distribution. Parameter δ is the decay rate of the good. For all three specifications, we consider
only a perishable good, hence δ = 1. Parameter varepsilon shows the habit strength. Four levels of wealth distributions
are examined. The first column of each specification shows the results for an egalitarian economy. Second, third and fourth
columns are unequally distributed economies, with the last one being the most unequal of all..
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Table A6: Economy with a single perishable good, convex tolerance and internal habit with
substitutability of past and current consumption
δ = 1, |ε| = 0.1, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.3433 0.3209 0.2764 0.2333
Re 0.3459 0.3232 0.2782 0.2346
Premium 0.26% 0.23% 0.18% 0.13%
δ = 1, |ε| = 0.5, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 1.4964 1.3839 1.1603 0.9707
Re 1.4990 1.3861 1.1619 0.9718
Premium 0.26% 0.22% 0.16% 0.11%
δ = 1, |ε| = 0.8, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 2.2800 2.0770 1.7439 1.4570
Re 2.2825 2.0789 1.7452 1.4580
Premium 0.24% 0.19% 0.14% 0.00%
? Table A6 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed by two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. Both types of agents have convex ART. We use three
different specifications conditionally to the strength of internal habit for our results. and assume the past and current
consumption to be complements. We set ART convexity by using a parameter of b = 2.0 and choose a relative risk aversion
parameter of r = 2, which is reasonable. The parameter h is at the same time the standard deviation and the coefficient
of variation of the wealth distribution. Parameter δ is the decay rate of the good. For all three specifications, we consider
only a perishable good, hence δ = 1. Parameter varepsilon shows the habit strength. Four levels of wealth distributions
are examined. The first column of each specification shows the results for an egalitarian economy. Second, third and fourth
columns are unequally distributed economies, with the last one being the most unequal of all..
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Chapter 2
Asset Prices and Wealth Inequality in Complete and
Incomplete Markets
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the average real return on stocks in United States has been about
6% per year higher than that on Treasury Bills (Kocherlakota, 1996). At the same time,
the average real return on Treasury Bills has been around 1% per year. The consumption-
based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) with standard preferences (power utility) fails
to explain sufficiently the high observed equity premium, the high volatility of returns and
the countercyclical variation in the equity premium (Lucas, 1978; Grossman and Shiller,
1981; Mehra and Prescott, 1985).
In response to these failures, financial economists have considered alternative models of
preferences. These models modify preferences so that the agent can be sensitive to rela-
tively poor consumption outcomes. One prominent approach is habit formation (or adjacent
complementarity in consumption), in which utility depends on consumption relative to a
reference level of consumption (Sundaresan, 1989; Abel, 1990; Constantinides, 1990; Ferson
and Constantinides, 1991; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). Introducing habit formation al-
39
ters the aggregate demand for equity in the following way. When the agents’ consumption
is closer to the habit level, agents fear further negative shocks since their utility is concave.
A given percentage change in consumption produces a much larger percentage change in
habit-adjusted consumption than in consumption itself. In this way, small fluctuations in
consumption growth can generate large variations in habit-adjusted consumption growth
and hence explain sizable excess returns on risky assets, even for moderate values of the
degree of risk aversion. Although habit-based asset pricing models are able to quantitatively
match the key empirical facts, these models must ultimately appeal to high risk aversion to
explain the high equity premium (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). A problem with high risk
aversion is that it has unappealing implications for large-scale risk (Kandel and Stambaugh,
1991; Rabin, 2000).
Other studies consider the impact of durable goods as a key factor for the performance of a
CCAPM type of model. In the standard model, the instantaneous utility function depends on
contemporaneous consumption rates only, i.e. commodities provide immediate gratification
through consumption. This choice of structure fails to capture the difference in functions
by a large fraction of commodities in the economy. Indeed, a wide array of commodities in
markets fulfill multiple needs. Durable goods typically play two roles: they provide services
and therefore utility over an extended period of time and they provide a ”status”. Status
has a symbolic function for consumers and therefore changes their utility. Related literature
explores the effect of durability on the equilibrium risk free rate and the asset risk premia
(Ferson and Constantinides, 1991; Detemple and Giannikos, 1996; Yogo, 2006; Donaldson
and Giannikos, 2003).
The objective of this paper is to study the relationship between (i) asset prices, (ii) the
heterogeneity of consumers’ wealth, (iii) market incompleteness, (iv) the nature of the good
and (v) habit persistence. We implement wealth inequality in a simple Arrow-Debreu1
1The Arrow – Debreu model suggests that under certain economic assumptions (convex preferences,
perfect competition, and demand independence) there must be a set of prices such that aggregate supplies
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exchange economy with identical agents that live only two periods2. A two-period model
is flexible and tractable and therefore, allows us to investigate equilibrium by using various
combinations of assumptions, despite its limitations3. Wealth inequality is introduced with
a mean-preserving transfer of endowment4. This creates the departure from an egalitarian
distribution of wealth.
Following Gollier (2001a), we remove the assumption that relative risk aversion is constant,
as there is no strong evidence to support this argument. Quite the opposite, a constant
absolute or relative risk aversion generates properties of optimal decisions which contradict
the empirical research on household portfolios and savings. Specifically, a utility function
which belongs to the HARA family implies that the relative share of wealth invested in
risky assets is constant. Furthermore, it implies that the investor’s age does not affect the
optimal allocation of a portfolio’s assets (Mossin, 1968) and it also generates a constant
marginal propensity to consume under certainty. This suggests the consideration of other
types of utility functions, such as in the case of Guiso and Paiella (2008) who reject CARA
preferences by finding that risk aversion is a decreasing function of endowment. We build
our complete market model based on this argument and we extend it by incorporating habit
forming preferences and a single durable good. Using a simple approximation of the wealth
distribution in the U.S. economy, with two and three classes of wealth we quantify the
effect of wealth inequality on asset prices after taking into account non-linear absolute risk
tolerance of agents.
The existing literature maintains the assumption of constant relative risk aversion but re-
will equal aggregate demands for every commodity in the economy.
2A two-period model can be thought of as a metaphor either of the present vs. the future of a long lived
consumer with alternating high and low income subject to borrowing constraints (Woodford, 1996).
3A two-period model does not allow to study asset pricing implications for business cycles or long-run
risk.
4Mean Preserving Spread Theorem: Let FA(x̃) and FB(x̃) be two distribution functions defined on the
same state space with identical means. If this is true, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) FA(x̃)SSDFB(x̃), (ii) FB(x̃) is a mean preserving spread of FA(x̃) according to x̃B = x̃A + z. For the
proof see Rothchild and Stiglitz (1970).
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laxes the assumption that markets are complete (Constantinides and Duffie, 1996, Heaton
and Lucas, 1996). In the real world, consumers face multiple risks simultaneously. The
largest component of wealth for most households is human capital. If labor income is per-
fectly correlated with traded assets, and if households can short those assets, then households
can hedge their labor income risk and undo the effects of labor income on their total port-
folio (Bodie et al., 1992; Farhi and Panageas, 2007). Moreover, as explained above, wealth
inequality has no effect on asset prices in the CRRA case when labor income is tradable.
However, in practice, much of the risk in labor income is idiosyncratic and therefore non-
tradable. Important contributions in the literature of uninsurable income risk include those
of Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987), Kimball (1993), Gollier and Pratt (1996) and Gollier (2001a
and 2001b). We extend the work of Gollier (2001a) by introducing a single durable good
and habit forming preferences and quantify the effect of wealth inequality on asset prices
when a background risk is present. This ”background risk5” increases effective risk aversion
and leads households to invest more cautiously (Heaton and Lucas 2000, Viceira 2001). Our
conclusion is that wealth inequality, durability and habit formation are serious features that
can contribute modestly to the resolution of the equity premium puzzle, in both complete
and incomplete markets.
Methodologically we build on Gollier (2001a) and Franke et al. (1998) and we extend their
work by introducing a single durable good in the economy, instead of a perishable good. One
strand of the literature studies the effect of market structure on the behavior of a durable
good (Swan, 1970; Levhari and Peles, 1973; Abel, 1983; Muller and Peles, 1988). The
motivation for studying the durability effects on a CCAPM model rests on the fact that,
since the high volatility of durable goods purchases constitutes an important macroeconomic
stylized fact (Baxter, 1996), there is reason to expect that this volatility may impact financial
phenomena as well (Donaldson and Giannikos, 2003). Durable goods provide immediate
5A risk that cannot be sold on markets and cannot be insured, due to asymmetric information and
incentives (Gollier, 2001b)
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utility as well as, possibly, future utility which reflect the symbolic value attached to the
ownership of the commodity. Therefore, a durable commodity is best described as a multi-
attribute commodity with two main attributes: status and services. Each of these attributes
is valued by agents who purchase the commodity to fulfill their needs for status and for
services. Detemple and Giannikos (1996) show that when the durable goods’ attributes are
perfect substitutes, irreversibility of the durable’s purchases may cause temporary excesses
of actual services over their desired level. In that way, the incorporation of durable goods
into an asset pricing model seems to have an important contribution on the explanation of
the equity premium or risk free rate puzzles.
We demonstrate that durability may increase asset risk premia under certain conditions;
hence, it may contribute to the resolution of the equity premium puzzle, under different
wealth distributions. A durable good affects the magnitude and direction of the asset prices
and consequently, the pricing kernel, which is a function of both the growth of the consump-
tion and the level of durability of the good. Substantial modifications in the behavior of
equilibrium commodity prices, asset and interest rates are recorded when the constraint on
consumption of the durable good is active. Effects of changes in durability on equilibrium
prices are assessed.
Next, we introduce habit persistence. Habit formation models have become increasingly im-
portant in explaining a number of dynamic asset pricing, such as the equity premium puzzle,
as well as macroeconomic facts, such as the response of consumption to monetary shocks
and savings and growth. Campbell and Cochrane (1999), in their effort to resolve the equity
premium puzzle, modify the standard representative-agent consumption-based asset pricing
model, by introducing a time-varying subsistence level to the power utility function. As the
consumption decreases toward the slow-moving habit, the curvature of the utility function
rises, thus risky asset prices decline and expected returns rise. Their habit specification has
three distinctive features. First, it is external as in the case of Abel’s (1990). Second, it
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moves slowly in response to consumption, in contrast to empirical specifications in which
each period’s habit is proportional to last period’s consumption (Ferson and Constantinides,
1991). Third, habit adapts non-linearly to the history of consumption, so that habit is al-
ways below consumption and marginal utility is always finite and positive. Constantinides
(1990) also relaxes the assumption of time separability of preferences and allows for habit
persistence in a representative agent model. According to his results, habit persistence drives
a wedge between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the inverse of intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution in consumption. In that way, the equity premium puzzle is resolved, by
showing that habit formation generates the sample mean and variance of the consumption
growth rate with low risk aversion.
For our analysis, we consider internal and external habit formation. The difference between
the two habit types rests on the effect that current consumption has on future habit. Abel
(1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) study models where habit formation is exogenous.
That is, past consumption enters the habit process without affecting the current consumption
choice. Dunn and Singleton (1986), Constantinides (1990) and Detemple and Zapatero
(1991) examine models with internal (or endogenous) habit. In these cases, past consumption
choice enters the habit process and has an effect on both current and future consumption
choices. As a result, the two types of habit persistence produce different stochastic discount
factors and lead to asset pricing implications. Our work suggests that wealth inequality
produces also different equity premia and risk free rates for different types and levels of
habit formation. Several specifications are considered throughout our study, although we
keep the habit strength parameter uniform across agents.
The rest of the study is as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model and methodology,
Section 3 demonstrates our data and calibrations, Section 4 discusses the results and Section
5 concludes.
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2.2 Theoretical Model and Methodology
2.2.1 Description of the economy
We consider a simple Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with a single type of asset. There is
a large number of n agents, i = 1, 2..., n in the economy, who live for two periods, ”today”
and the ”future”. These periods are indexed by t = 0 and t = 1 respectively. We assume a
G time 1 measurable payoff on the market portfolio, continuous at R+. At date t = 0 there
is uncertainty about the state of the world that will prevail at t = 1. At the beginning of
t = 0, each agent is endowed with a single durable good, that supplies a service. The good
is characterized by a depreciation rate 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 , and is homogeneous across agents. For
δ = 1 , the good is perishable. The decay method is one-hoss-shay6. The durability of the
good is inserted through an exogenous process into the budget constraint.
At this point, it is necessary to determine how the agents should allocate their initial endow-
ment of the good between immediate consumption and saving/investment for the future. To
keep the model simple, we assume that all agents have identical preferences, represented by
the subjective discount factor β. They also have the same attitude towards risk and consump-
tion smoothing over time. The economy is characterized by the von Neuman-Morgenstern
utility function u on consumption at each period. It is well known that the standard vNM
(or expected) preferences exhibit a strong interdependence between risk and time prefer-
ences. This function is increasing (u′ > 0), twice continuously differentiable and strictly
concave (u′′ < 0). The concavity of u implies that there is a preference for consumption
smoothing over time. The uncertainty is characterized by S possible states of nature, in-
dexed by s = 1, ...s, ...S7 and by the associated state probabilities p1, ...ps. This implies that
the marginal utility of the good in current and future period is decreasing.
Assume also a frictionless complete market for insurance and credit contracts on G that
6The durable good delivers the same services throughout its lifetime before failing with zero scrap value.
7State s = 0 designates period 0, rather than a possible state to occur at date t.
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takes place at t = 0 . Let π0 and πs be the equilibrium prices to be paid at t = 0 for
the delivery of 1 unit of the good respectively at t = 0 and t = 1, conditional on state s8.
We price the durable good with a spot contract. The law of motion of the durable good is
Ds = (1− δ)D0 + Cs, where Ds is the stock of durable good at state s and Cs are the units
of the durable good at state s. In the first period (state 0) the good has D0 = C0 and in
each subsequent state s = 1, ...s, ...S the good has Ds = (1− δ)D0 + Cs.
At date 0, there is inequality in the endowment for each agent, where wi0 is agent i’s endow-
ment of the single consumption good at that period. Agent i is also endowed with a bundle






is not constant in s, i.e. the income per capita in state s is random.
Research studies suggest that habits may play a key role in consumption behavior. In
reality, there is no theoretical foundation for the assumption that utility is time-additive.
A reasonable variation of time-additive utility is to allow utility at each date to depend
either on the average consumption of the economy or on the agent’s past consumption.
The idea that people care about their consumption relative to that of others dates back
at least to Veblen (1899), who describes ”conspicuous consumption” as an effort to achieve
social status. Concern of consumption relative to that of others is commonly described as
a desire to ”keep up with the Joneses”. In the models belonging to this family, habits are
exogenously determined. Another interpretation is that an investor becomes habituated to
a certain standard of living and evaluates her present consumption in light of that standard
of living. In this case, habits are endogenously determined.
8We also assume a market for risk-free assets. A risk-free asset is a bundle containing exactly one unit of
each the Arrow-Debreu securities. The agent can borrow or lend non-contingent (riskless) assets that pay
1+r per unit on date 1 regardless of the state of nature, where r is the riskless real rate of interest. However,
in the complete markets’ case, as above, where Arrow securities exist for every state, the bond market is
redundant.
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In the early dynamic theoretical models of habit persistence, the utility function takes the
additive form and is derived from the difference between current consumption and the habit
stock. Our consumption-savings model after the introduction of habit formation becomes:
max
Di
u(Di0, xi0) + β
S∑
s=1
ps u(Dis, xis) (2.1)
s.t.
π0(Di0 − wi0) +
S∑
s=1
πs(Dis − wis) = 0, (2.2)
and
Dis = (1− δ)Di0 + Cis (2.3)
where Dis and xis are the investor’s consumption and habit, respectively. Let q0 =
1
β
and qs = ps for s = 1, . . . s, . . . S. The two-period savings portfolio decision problem is









πs(Dis − wis) = 0 (2.5)
and
Dis = (1− δ)Di0 + Cis (2.6)
We consider external habits (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) and internal habits (Constan-
tinides, 1990) in the additive form, where intratemporal utility is written over the difference
between consumption and habit.
External Habit Formation: External habit is a function of per-capita contemporaneous
consumption. Each agent is concerned with her current consumption relative to that of
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others.
xis = εDs, 0 < ε < 1




i=1 Dis. Ds is treated as pure
externality in this context, because the sum of individual consumption equals the aggregate
endowment process, which is exogenous.





where 0 < Sis < 1.
In order for the representative agent to have finite utility, S must be a nonnegative process.
S can be interpreted as a business cycle indicator. In growth states, the surplus consumption
ratio is large and in recession states it is small.
Internal Habit Formation: Internal habit is defined as a function of the agent’s specific
past consumption. Each agent is concerned with her prior consumption.
xis = εDi0
where Di0 is the consumption of agent i at t = 0. If ε > 0, consumption at different time pe-
riods are complementary goods. By increasing the current consumption, the investors habit
increases in the future. Future marginal utility is also increased. For ε < 0, consumption
at different time periods are substitute goods. By increasing the current consumption, the
investors habit decreases in the future. Future marginal utility is also reduced. In our model
we assume nonnegative consumption and we assume the habit stock xis to have the same
sign as ε for every state s.
When the consumption of agent i goes closer to the habit level xis, the curvature of the
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utility function becomes time-varying (and therefore we have time-varying risk premia).
The coefficient of relative risk aversion becomes:




2.2.2 The Representative Agent Problem
The competitive equilibrium satisfies the following set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
qsu
′(Dis, xis) = λiπs, i = 1, . . . n, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (2.9)











wis, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (2.10)
The mutuality principle of Pareto efficient allocations holds and implies that all diversifiable
risks have been washed out of equilibrium9.
The marginal rates of substitution between consumption at current period and in any specific
state at future period are equalized across agents in equilibrium. The representative agent
exhibit preferences such that û(zs, xs) = π(zx, xs) for all z and let this function û referred to
as “representative agent utility function” from now on. The representative agent consumes
the income per capita in all states and at all dates. The asset prices in the egalitarian
economy of n identical agents with utility function û would be exactly the same as in an
unequal economy.
The competitive equilibrium can be expressed by the following stochastic discount factor (or
pricing kernel) πs
qs
= π(δ, zs, xs) and by a set of functions Di(.) such that Dis = Di(zs), for
9Suppose for example that there are only two states, and the income levels per capita are the same in
the two states. This means that there is no aggregate risk in the economy. In this context, according to the
mutuality principle, all agents are fully insured at equilibrium. Departing from this rule would force people
to face zero-mean risks, which because of risk aversion is a Pareto-inferior allocation.
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every i and s. The pricing kernel can therefore be written as




As it seems the stochastic discount factor is a function of the agent i’s consumption, habit
and the nature of the good. Clearly, this will have an effect on the equity premium and the








τ(D, x) = − u
′(D, x)
u′′(D, x)



















This formula is intuitive. It states that the share of the aggregate risk carried by agent i
at equilibrium, which is measured by the sensitiveness of their own consumption to income
per capita, is proportional to their degree of absolute risk tolerance (Wilson, 1968) and
consequently, proportional to the decay rate of the good. More risk tolerant agents bear
a larger share of the aggregate risk. This share becomes higher when the durability of the
good or the bait persistence of the agent are taken into consideration.
The representative agent problem becomes













Di = z (2.15)
Wealth inequality is concentrated in its entirety in the vector Λ of lagrange multipliers. If
the endowment of each agent i is the same, the λi would be the same for every agent. When
u belongs to the HARA utility functions, wealth distribution has no effect on asset pricing.
A necessary condition for the impact of different wealth distributions on equity premium is
to have a non-linear absolute risk tolerance (Gollier 2001a).
2.2.3 Asset Pricing
We now analyze the impact of wealth inequality on the equity premium and the risk free
rate. Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989) show that the representative agent of
Lucas (1978) fails to predict the equity risk premium and the risk free rate, as observed in
the data. According to Weil’s calibrations, while the risk free rate is estimated at 4% per
year the observed risk free rate is around 1%. Mehra and Prescott can explain an equity risk
premium of, at most, 0.35%, while the observed equity premium is 6%. This discrepancy
between theory and data raises several questions. A question we could ask is which risk free
rate we should use in order to discount costs and benefits of public investment projects. The
costs and benefits of most public policies are not spread equally across citizens. Thus, it is
interesting to study if wealth inequality can explain the difference between theory and data.





′(zs, xs). Risky assets and bonds
have payoff vectors Ge = (0, z1, z2, ..., zS) and G
b = (0, 1, 1, ..., 1) respectively. The relative









The risk free asset provides one unit of consumption good at t = 1 with probability 1. The


















where z0 is the current level of income per capita and z is the income per capita at the
maturity of the gross risk free rate.
Preferences: In asset pricing literature, the utility function that is widely used belongs
to the HARA class. However, HARA utility, among its attractive properties, has a few
unattractive ones. First of all, it does not rule out negative consumption, secondly, it
implies that poor and rich agents reduce their consumption by exactly the same amount
in reaction to a given risk (Kimball, 1990; Carroll and Kimball, 1996) and thirdly, it is iso-
elastic. Although we will not address the third unattractive property on this paper, we can
compensate for the first two with the following specification.
We estimate the relation between the index of absolute risk aversion and individual endow-
ment, by using the following specification (the agent’s index i is omitted for brevity), as in









where w denotes the lifetime endowment, H is a vector of consumer characteristics affecting
individual preferences, η is a random shock to preferences, and ξ, γ and b are unknown
parameters. The absolute risk aversion α(w) is always positive and decreasing in w for all
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positive values of b. Furthermore, if b > 0 then a(w) is always convex in w.
This empirical specification does not allow for heterogeneity in the b-parameter. If b varies
across individuals then estimates would be affected by heteroscedasticity. However, a formula
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the error term is homoscedastic (Guiso and Paiella,
2008).







For b > 0 the ART is an increasing function of w. Moreover, it will be concave, linear or
convex in w, depending on whether b is less than, equal to, or greater than 1. Because b
measures the speed at which ρ(.) declines with endowment, it follows that τ(.) is a concave
(resp. convex) function of w if absolute risk aversion falls as consumption increases at a lower
speed (resp. greater) than 1, which is the value characterizing CRRA preferences. Although
the equation for RRA is assumed, a utility function that gives rise to a measure of absolute
















which converges to the power utility u(w) = w
1−r
1−r , as b tends to 1. If b = 1, then r =
ξexp[γH + η] measures relative risk aversion.
Taking logs on both sides of equation about tolerance, the above empirical specification
becomes
log τ = − log r + b logw = − log ξ − γH + b logw − η
The curvature of absolute risk tolerance – as well as the relation between absolute risk aver-
sion and endowment – is therefore parameterized by the value of b.
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In terms of our complete market analysis, the utility function belongs to the class of functions
such that
u′(z, x) = exp
[











In economic recessions, investors are exposed to the double hazard of stock market losses and
job loss. Investment in equities not only fails to hedge the risk of job loss but accentuates its
implications. Investors require a hefty equity premium in order to be induced to hold equities.
Given that, a question that rises is whether the existence of this uninsurable risk can explain
the equity premium puzzle. As long as the preferences are vulnerable, then a background risk
can contribute to that, although we are concerned about the magnitude of its effect (Gollier
and Pratt, 1996). Moreover, Gollier (2001a) shows in his seminal study that risk vulnerability
of preferences implies that in the presence of an independent background risk with a non-
positive mean, the indirect utility is more concave than the original utility. Because the
CRRA utility exhibits risk vulnerability, this suggests that the model with background risk
has the potential to explain the observed equity premium with an economically realistic value
of the agent’s original utility function curvature parameter. Risk vulnerability guarantees
that any zero-mean background risk raises the aversion towards any other independent risk.
Our model is enhanced in the following way. We assume that agents in the economy face
non-hedgeable background risks such as in the case of a recession, as mentioned above. These
background risks which could, for example, be associated with labor income or holdings of
non-marketable assets are uninsurable. Therefore, to this extent, markets are incomplete10.
10Market incompleteness assumes one of the following forms: (1) certain securities) are not traded, and/or
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Agents faced with background risks respond by demanding insurance in the form of options
on the marketable risks. Following Franke et al. (1998), the agent’s wealth at time 1 is z+y,
where y is the background risk. This risk is idiosyncratic in the population of consumers.
Utility is given by v(z, x) = Eu(z + y, x), where a complete market exists for z, and y is a
non-hedgeable background risk. In this case, the amount an investor can consume depends
not only on the risky payoff, but also on the background risk. The background risk y is
independent of the market portfolio payoff z. Moreover, E(y) = 0 so that the non-hedgeable
income is a pure risk, with a non-positive mean. This background risk is also a time 1
measurable random variable, denoted yi = σiki, where ki is a random variable with non-
positive mean and unit variance and σi is a constant measuring the size of the background
risk. We also assume that yi is bounded from below.
The economy with agents having a utility function u and facing the idiosyncratic risk y is
equivalent to an economy with agents having a utility function v and no background risk.
The absolute risk tolerance of v equals
Tv(z) = −
Eu′(z + y, x)
Eu′′(z + y, x)
,
when evaluated at z. Differentiating with respect to z yields
T ′v(z) = −
Eu′(z + y, x)Eu′′′(z + y, x)
[Eu′′(z + y, x)]2
− 1
A zero-mean background risk has the effect of reducing the degree of absolute risk tolerance:
T ′v(z, x) <= Tu(z, x) for all z. This corresponds to the natural hypothesis that independent
risks are substitutes rather than complements. Now, it seems natural to assume that the
adverse effect of a given background risk on the degree of tolerance towards the independent
portfolio risk is smaller for poor agents than for wealth agents.
(2) certain individuals are for some reason excluded from financial market participation. A complete market
structure where all investors can trade any security is necessary for the construction of the representative
agent.
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This is true only if T ′v(z, x) is less than T
′
u(z, x).
The consumer’s maximization problem now becomes
maxE{Ey[v( (z − x) + y)]} (2.20)
such that
E(z − z0)π = 0 (2.21)
And the first order conditions are:
Ey[v
′( (z − x) + y)] = λπ (2.22)
Preferences: All agents in the economy have hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA)
utility for wealth at the end of a single time period. This assumption allows us to compare
optimal sharing rules in the presence of background risk with the linear sharing rules that
exist in an economy with HARA utility and no background risks. The sharing rule is con-
cave for the agents that experience low or no background risk and convex for those with
high background risk. Thus, the non-linearity in our model is attributable to differential
background risk. We define the HARA type as
v(z, x) = −ζ
[
η +




for some constants η and ζ subject to the feasibility constraint
η +




2.3 Data and Calibrations
GDP per capita: Let us first consider a simple society in which every agent would be
promised the same share of the aggregate production in the future. This means that the
risk borne by every agent i is measured by the uncertainty affecting the growth of GDP per
head. All other risks are washed away by diversification. In order to assess the degree of
risk associated to every one’s income in the future, let us examine how volatile the growth
of GDP per capita has been in the past. In Figure 1, we reproduce the time series of US
GDP per capita in 2005 dollars, for the period from 1950 to 2010. By long term historical
standards, per capita GDP growth has been high: around 2% per year. However this growth
rate has been variable over time, as shown in Figure 2. This series appears to be ergodic
and stationary. The standard deviation of the growth rate has been around 2.6%.
Figure 1: US Real GDP per capita in 2005 dollars, source: Penn World
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Figure 2: Growth rate of the US real GDP per capita, in %
Now, let’s return to our model and assume a two-period exchange economy with a repre-
sentative agent and examine a simple macroeconomic uncertainty. Period t = 1 consists
of two states of the world. State 1 is defined as the recession state and state 2 is defined
as the growth state. In state 1, the consumption per capita is reduced by 1% (z1 = 0.99),
with a probability of 61.756%. In state 2 the consumption per capita is increased by 6.32%
(z2 = 1.0632) with a probability of 38.244%.
Thus, we can state that the income per capita is as follows:
zs =

z0 = 1, with certainty
z1 = 0.99, future recession with prob = 61.756%
z2 = 1.0632, future growth with prob = 38.244%

Return on non-durables, durables and bonds: Quarterly data for the growth rates
of durable and non-durable goods output is drawn from the National Income and Product
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Accounts (NIPA) for the period 1951-2016. Non-durable consumption is measured as the
sum of real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) on nondurable goods and services.
Nondurable goods are goods that have an average useful life of less than 3 years and include
food, clothing and shoes, housing, utilities, transportation, and medical care.
Figure 3: Nondurable Consumption and Durables Stock Growth
Durable goods have an average useful life of at least 3 years and consist of items such as
motor vehicles and parts, furnishings and durable household equipment, recreational goods
and vehicles, etc. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes year-end estimates of
the chained quantity index for the net stock of consumer durable goods. Using quarterly
data for real PCE on durable goods, we construct a quarterly series for the stock of durable
goods. Implicit in the data for the stock of durables are the depreciation rates used by the
BEA for various components of durable goods. The implied depreciation rate for durable
goods as a whole is approximately 6% per quarter. Following Yogo (2006), we use data since
1951, as the period immediately after the war is associated with unusually high durable
consumption growth due to the rapid restocking of durable goods.
Wealth Distribution: For our first set of calibrations we consider a simple wealth distri-
bution, with two equally weighted classes, poor and rich, as in Heaton and Lucas (1996) and
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Gollier (2001a). The poor are endowed with a share of 1− h of the GDP per capita in each
state, and the rich are endowed with the rest 1 + h. The parameter h is at the same time
the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of the wealth distribution.
In reality, the U.S. economy is much more unequal and in more dimensions than wealth.
People differ in wealth, income and earnings as well as in luck, talents, opportunities, con-
sumption, leisure, bequest and so on. Other features of inequality include age, education,
employment status, marital status and financial condition. Such heterogeneity is difficult to
be explained by a two-class society (Krusell and Smith, 1997).
Thus, for our second set of calibrations we focus on three social classes, with data drawn
from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF contains a sample size of 4,500
households, which may be smaller than that of other samples, such as the Current Population
Survey (CPS), but is particularly useful to represent the upper tail of the distributions by
oversampling the rich. In addition to providing sample data on household earnings, income,
and wealth, the SCF includes detailed information on other features of inequality, such as
age, education, employment status, marital status, and household composition. For the
purpose of our study we focus only on wealth inequality.
Table 1: Concentration of Wealth and Income in US economy; Source: SCF, Diaz-Gimenez
et al., 2011
Wealth Income
Coefficient of variation 6.02 4.32
Variance of the logs 4.53 0.99
Mean/Median 4.61 1.77
We approximate the actual distribution of U.S. households by assuming three social classes:
40% are poor, 5% are rich, and the remaining 55% belong to the middle class. Tables 1 and
2 report wealth statistics of each class, from 1997 and 2007. Rich agents own as much as
49.2% of total wealth, whereas poor own only 0.9% of it.
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Table 2: Wealth Partition in US economy; Source: CSF, Diaz-Gimenez et al. 1997, 2011
GDP % GDP/capita %
Class Population (%) 1997 2007 1997 2007
Poor 40% 1.35% 0.9% 3.375% 2.25%
Middle 55% 45.15% 49.9% 82.09% 90.73%
Rich 5% 53.5% 49.2% 1070% 984%
Each poor owns 2.25% of the GDP per capita in each state. Each individual in the middle
class gets about 90.73% of the GDP per capita, and each rich agent owns 984 times the GDP
per capita.
Background Risk: Labor income is subject to idiosyncratic fluctuations. Due to asymmet-
ric information or limited enforcement, it seems plausible to assume that agents have only
limited insurance against this risk. Heaton and Lucas (1996) follow the approach of Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994) and assume no insurance markets for idiosyncratic risk, over and
above agents can save in aggregate assets. The problem in solving these models is that the
standard aggregation results break down. Thus, wealth distribution enters as a state variable
(Rios-Rull, 1994). Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) obtain good predictions of future prices,
by focusing on a restricted set of relevant moments of the wealth distribution, such as the
fraction of constrained agents. Specifically, they find very little effect of background risk on
asset prices, due to that labor-income process is not very persistent. As a result, agents are
able to smooth these shocks by using a bond.
Turning to our analysis, we quantify the effect of wealth inequality in an incomplete market
by introducing a uninsurable labor income risk. To keep things simple, we assume that this
background risk y is distributed as (−k, 1/2; +k, 1/2). Parameter k is the standard deviation
of the growth of labor income. We obtain the equity premium as a function of the size k
of the uninsurable risk. Figure 4 reports the results of equity premium with background
61
risk in an egalitarian economy with a single perishable good. The agents exhibit CRRA
preferences. We observe that a very large background risk is required to explain the equity
premium puzzle, with a standard deviation of the annual growth of individual labor income
exceeding 70%. Our setting consists only of two periods, but Telmer (1993) obtained similar
conclusions in an infinite period framework. Given this result, in the next section we will
quantify the effect of background risk in an unequal economy when there is a single durable
good and the agents exhibit habit forming preferences. For the purpose of our study, each
agent will bear a fifty-fifty chance to win or lose k = 0.25.
Figure 4: Equity premium with background risk in an egalitarian economy
2.4 Discussion of Results
The introduction of wealth inequality in an economy alters the aggregate demand in two
ways. First, poorer agents become more risk averse, hence they demand less risky assets.
On the other hand, wealthier people have a larger demand for equity, since they are more
tolerant to risk. Under linear risk tolerance the demand for risky assets is linear in wealth,
which implies that the two effects exactly compensate for each other, so that the aggregate
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demand at the original equilibrium price is unaffected. But with increasing absolute risk
tolerance the effects do not wash out. As a result, the different wealth distributions have an
effect on the equilibrium asset prices.
In our study, we incorporate habit forming preferences and durability of the good to show
if the discrepancy between theory and empirics is still substantial. It turns out that wealth
inequality, habits and degree of durability are a step towards explaining the puzzles in
literature. The introduction of a durable good implies an effect of past purchases on current
utility and choices. Durability changes the structural form of asset risk premia. In particular,
comparison of equilibria across economies reveals that asset risk premia may be higher when
the good is durable. The source of this effect is the non-separability of the past and present
consumption of the durable good.
Habit formation enhances the agents’ desire to smooth consumption over time.This charac-
teristic was found especially useful in solving the equity premium puzzle and in matching
several stylized facts in growth, and business cycles theory as, for example, the high persis-
tence in the U.S. output volatility. Introducing habit formation alters the aggregate demand
for equity in the following way. When the agents’ consumption is closer to the habit level
x, they fear further negative shocks since their utility is concave. Habit forming consumers
dislike variations in habit-adjusted consumption rather than variations in consumption it-
self. A given percentage change in consumption produces a much larger percentage change
in habit-adjusted consumption than in consumption itself. In this way, small fluctuations
in consumption growth can generate large variations in habit-adjusted consumption growth
and hence explain sizable excess returns on risky assets. even for moderate values of the
degree of risk aversion. We continue with the analysis of our results. The corresponding
tables are reported in Appendix 2.A.
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2.4.1 Complete Markets
Two Classes: We start by analyzing a society with two equally weighted classes of wealth,
poor and rich. We assume a utility function with a non-linear absolute risk tolerance, as
in the family given by (19). The coefficient of relative risk aversion r is set at 2 for all
of our calibrations, which is reasonable and consistent with the micro-finance literature.
Parameter δ is the decay rate of the durable good and ranges from 0 to 1. For δ = 1 the
good is perishable. The parameter ε determines the habit strength and ranges from 0 to 1
for external habits. In the case of internal habits, we may have either ε > 0 for complement
consumption between two dates, or ε < 0 for substitute consumption. For ε = 0 there is no
habit persistence. Lastly, parameter b shows the curvature of the absolute risk tolerance of
the agent. For b < 1 the ART is concave, for b > 1 the ART is convex and for b = 1 the
ART is linear. We replicate the results of Gollier (2001a), reported in Table A1. The good
is perishable in Gollier’s (2001a) exchange economy. Wealth inequality raises (decreases)
return on risky assets and the equity premium when the absolute risk tolerance is concave
(convex) and has no effect on asset pricing when the absolute risk tolerance is linear, as in
the case of CRRA preferences. In terms of magnitude, when the economy is egalitarian, i.e.
the coefficient of variation of wealth h is 0, and agents exhibit concave ART (b = 0.5), the
equity risk premium is 0.25%. It rises to 0.30% - a 20% increase - when the economy is
unequal with an h = 0.9.
We introduce a single durable good with a high depreciation rate δ = 0.94. The choice
of our parameter is reasonable for a two-period model with a single durable good11. Table
A2 reports the corresponding results. As it is expected, the direction of the asset prices
does not change with the introduction of durability in an unequal economy. Asset prices
increase when wealth inequality increases (decreases) and agents exhibit concave (convex)
11Donaldson and Giannikos (2003) calibrate an infinite period model with two goods, a perishable and a
durable one, with lower depreciation rates.
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ART. What changes is the magnitude of the equilibrium prices. We observe that even a very
high depreciation rate - the durable good is almost perishable for a δ = 0.94 - can cause
a large effect on equity premium. Specifically, when the coefficient of variation is h = 0.9,
the equity premium rises to 0.33%, a 22% increase from 0.27% in the egalitarian economy.
Table A3 reports further results of equity premium with different depreciation rates. The
results are interesting. For a δ = 6%, which is the implied depreciation rate for durables as
a whole, the equity premium approaches its historically observed level and rises from 0.87%
in the egalitarian economy to 1.22% in an unequal economy with h = 0.9, an 40% increase.
For our next set of estimations, we introduce habit formation (Tables A4, A5, A6 and A7)
and restrict our analysis to a perishable good, in order to isolate the effect of habits. We
start with an exogenously determined habit (Tables A4 and A5), in the sense of Campbell
and Cochrane (1999). The direction of asset prices is not reversed with the introduction of
external habits. Wealth inequality raises (decreases) the equity premium when the ART is
concave (convex), as expected. For a low habit (ε = 0.1) the results for equity premium are
not marginally better than in the standard asset pricing model of Gollier (2001a). Table
A5 reports further results of equity premium with different external habit persistence. We
notice that as the habit persistence increases, the asset prices decrease. Consequently, the
equity premium decreases. In an unequal economy with h = 0.9 and an ε = 0.1, the equity
premium is 0.31% and falls to 0.17% when the habit strength increases to 0.9.
We continue with internal habits (Tables A6 and A7) and restrict our analysis to a habit
strength ε < 0, i.e. the consumption at any two different dates are substitute goods. That
means that consumption at any date is less important (marginal utility is lower) if consump-
tion was high previously. The direction of asset prices is not reversed with the introduction of
internal habits12. We observe that even a very low habit (ε = −0.03) drives the asset prices
up, thus in an unequal economy with agents exhibiting concave ART the equity premium
12The introduction of internal habits with complement consumption reverses the direction of asset prices,
but we do not report results for this specification
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increases even further. Table A7 reports further results of equity premium with different
degrees of internal habit persistence. Interestingly enough, and in contrast with the external
habit case, a very strong habit causes the equity premium to increase. Specifically, when
ε = 0.9, wealth inequality increases the equity premium to 1.36%, an 38% increase from the
egalitarian economy with a premium of 0.99%.
Three Classes: Next, we analyze a more realistic society, composed of three unequally
weighted classes of wealth; 40% are poor, 55% belong to the middle class and 5% are rich.
Each poor agent owns 2.25% of the GDP per capita in each state, each consumer from the
middle class gets 90.73% of the GDP per capita and each rich agent owns 984 times the GDP
per capita13. We assume again a utility function with a non-linear absolute risk tolerance
and incorporate durability and habit formation.
Table A8 reports results for different depreciation rates of the durable good in a non-habit
forming economy (ε = 0). We do that in order to isolate the effect of durability. In the case
of a perishable good (δ = 1), when the ART is linear (b = 1), as in the case of HARA utility
functions, the equity premium is 0.26% per year. For a convex ART (b = 2) the equity
premium drops to 0%, because the (almost) risk-neutral rich (almost) completely insure the
poor and the middle. In the case of a concave ART (b = 0.5), the equity premium rises to
0.35%. As is observed, the equity premium in this setting is much higher than in the case of
an equally weighted two-classes society. It is expected that the refinement of wealth classes
yields better calibration results.
By making the good more durable, i.e. lowering its decay rate, the equity premium increases
further. A decay rate δ = 0.97, yields an equity premium of 0.39% in the concave ART
specification. This is an increase of 11.4% over the perishable good’s premium. The return
on equity and risk free rate are kept in lower levels than in the two-classes economy. This
13We have calibrated the three-classes model with the 1997 data as well, but the conclusions drawn do
not differ and thus, results are not reported for this specification.
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means that durability and wealth inequality yield more reasonable results in a three-classes
society. A decay rate of 0.94 yields an equity premium equal to 0.45%, which is an 27.4%
increase over the perishable good case. Figure A1 plots the equity premium (in %) as the
curvature of ART changes from concave to convex. for a perishable and a durable good
(δ = 0.97). We observe that as long as the agents have concave ART, the equity premium
is larger for a durable good. As the ART becomes more convex there is practically no
difference between holding a durable good from a perishable one, even in an unequally
distributed economy. Our conclusion does not change for higher depreciation rates (shown
in Table A11). For instance, a decay rate of 0.1 generates a premium of 3.8%, which is a
huge increase over the equivalent premium of 1.15% in the two-classes society.
For our next set of calibrations we isolate the effect of habit formation, by keeping the good
perishable. We introduce external and internal habits (with substitute consumption) to our
three classes society. Table A9 shows results for external habits. We observe that a non-habit
forming economy overpredicts the equilibrium return on equity and the equilibrium risk free
rate. As the habit strength increases the asset prices move closer to their observed levels.
When agents exhibit convex ART the equity premium becomes practically 0 for any habit
factor. When agents exhibit concave ART, a very low habit (ε = 0.04) causes the equity
premium to increase marginally to 0.36%, from 0.35% in a non-habit forming economy. A
striking result arises: In the two classes society, as we increase the habit factor, the asset
prices increase as well. But in the unequally weighted three classes economy the asset prices
decrease and move closer to their observed levels, as we increase the habit strength. At
the same time, the equity premium, although marginally, rises. Table A11 reports results
for higher external habit persistence. The difference between equity premia for a non-habit
forming economy and one with external habits (ε = 0.04) is shown in Figure A2. As the
ART becomes more convex there is practically no difference in equity premia between an
economy with and without external habits, even in an unequally distributed economy. Our
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conclusion does not change for higher habit persistence. What is also shown in this figure is
that the equity premium does not necessarily start from a higher level in an unequal economy
with external habits, than in a non-habit forming one. That depends on the degree of the
ART curvature and on the level of habit persistence. For a b < 0.1, the equity premium in
the external habits’ case is lower than in the non-habit one. It eventually catches up for a
b = 0.1. By looking at Table A11 we can observe that the introduction of a low external
habit (ε = 0.1) causes a huge increase in the equity premium, but falls steeply as the habit
persistence becomes higher.
Table A10 shows results for internal habits when there is substitutability of consumption.
When agents exhibit concave ART, internal habits raise the equity premium in an unequal
economy. The premium goes from 0.35% to 0.41% for a very low internal habit factor of
−0.04. Table A11 reports results for higher levels of habit persistence, when ART is concave.
Figure A3 shows the difference between equity premia for a non-habit forming economy and
one with internal habits (ε = −0.04). As the ART becomes more convex there is practically
no difference in equity premia between an economy with and without internal habits, even
in an unequally distributed economy. Our conclusion does not change for higher internal
habit persistence. We observe that internal habits have a higher impact on risk premia. For
an ε = −0.9 we get an equity premium of 3.84%, a big improvement over the two-classes
society equivalent premium.
2.4.2 Incomplete Markets
We now analyze the effect of a small uninsurable labor income risk (k = 0.25) on asset
prices, in a society with two equally weighted classes of wealth, poor and rich, endowed with
50% and 150% of the GDP per capita, respectively.14. The background risk increases the
risk aversion to any other independent risks and induces the agents to reduce their demand
14Following Gollier (2001a), we do not report results for three classes of wealth in our incomplete market
setting
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for risky assets with independent returns, whatever the agents’ initial wealth. We assume
a CRRA utility function, with a coefficient of relative risk aversion r = 2. Parameter δ is
the decay rate of the durable good and ranges from 0 to 1. The parameter ε determines the
habit strength and ranges from 0 to 1 for external habits. In the case of internal habits,
we may have either ε > 0 for complement consumption between two dates, or ε < 0 for
substitute consumption.
Table A12 reports results for a perishable (δ = 1) and a durable good (δ = 0.94), when
there is no habit formation (ε = 0). Wealth inequality raises the equity premium in both
cases, although only marginally. When the good is perishable, the premium increases to
0.2995%, an 1.6% increase over the egalitarian setting. The premium becomes 0.32% after
the introduction of durability in the unequal economy. Tables A13 and A14 report results
for external (ε = 0.1 and 0.3) and internal habits (ε = −0.02 and −0.04). We conclude that
in an incomplete market setting with a low income risk, the effect of wealth inequality on
asset prices is marginal. We observe that the increase on equity premium is, at best, small,
even with a very low decay rate or high habit strength15. Gollier (2001a) first showed that if
the background risk becomes larger, this may reduce the equity premium. Figure A4 plots
the equity premium as a function of the background risk, for a perishable and a durable good
with non-habit forming preferences. As long as income uncertainty is low, wealth inequality
raises the equity premium. But for a large income risk, such as for a k = 0.5, the equity
premium is reduced with wealth inequality.
With the addition of durability or habit formation in our model, the magnitude of the back-
ground risk required to decrease the equity premium changes. In particular, an even larger
background risk is required to reduce the equity premium when we have a durable good. Fig-
ure A5 and A6 show the equity premium as a function of the background risk, in an unequal
economy with habit forming preferences of agents. Figure A5 refers to external habits, while
15Table A15 reports results for the equity premium in an unequal economy, for lower depreciation rates,
and higher external and internal habit persistence.
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Figure A6 refers to internal habits (with substitutability of consumption). In the external
habit case, we observe that for a low background risk, the equity premia are almost the
same for either specification. With a low income uncertainty wealth inequality raises the
equity premium, but for a larger uninsurable income risk, wealth inequality decreases the
premium. The interesting result here is that in the case of external habits, an even lower
income uncertainty is required to decrease the premium. On the other hand, when agents
exhibit internal habit persistence, an even higher income uncertainty (than in the egalitarian
economy) is required to decrease the premium. For instance, at Figure A6 we observe that
as income uncertainty increases, the premium increases up to a maximum k of around 35%
for the non habit economy and up to 40% for the economy with internal habits. From these
points and after, wealth inequality decreases the equity premium.
2.5 Conclusion
The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between asset prices, wealth het-
erogeneity, the nature of the good, habit formation and the market incompleteness. The
paper is motivated by the fact that there is no strong evidence in favor of the CARA or
CRRA utility functions, dominantly used in literature to explain asset prices. Economists
used to calibrate a model a la Lucas with a family of utility functions exhibiting linear ab-
solute risk tolerance (HARA) which entails exponential, power and logarithmic functions.
When consumers are HARA and face no uninsurable risk, then the distribution of wealth
has no effect on the equity premium and on the risk-free rate. In this paper, we inquire
about whether taking into account the unequal distribution of wealth may explain the eq-
uity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle, when there is a single durable good and
the preferences of the agents are habit forming.
Wealth inequality is introduced with a mean preserving transfer of endowment. We use two
specifications for our classes of wealth, two equally weighted classes, poor and rich and three
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unequally weighted classes, poor, middle and rich.The classes of wealth are parameterized
based on historical data from the Survey of Consumer Finance. In a complete market setting,
wealth inequality raises the equity premium when the absolute risk tolerance is concave. The
results for the equity premium become higher when the nature of a good or habit formation
are considered and can approach the observed historical levels, under certain conditions.
We observe also that not only wealth inequality, but also inequality in population of classes
raises the equity premium. Our calibrations show an improved equity premium when we
consider a more realistic economy.
Finally, we examine the effect of wealth inequality in a model that has been frequently used in
recent years, i.e. a model with a linear absolute risk tolerance but including an idiosyncratic
background risk. We show that the presence of a small uninsurable background risk biases
asset prices towards a larger equity premium. However, considering that agents exhibit
CRRA preferences, the effect is at best small, even after the introduction of durability and
habits. Furthermore, we document the following interesting result. While Gollier (2001a)
showed that wealth inequality raises the equity premium when income uncertainty is low
but decreases it for large income uncertainty, we show that with the addition of durability
or habit formation in our model, the magnitude of the background risk required to decrease
the equity premium changes. When the good is durable or agents exhibit internal habit
persistence (with substitutability of consumption), a higher background risk is required to




Table A1: Returns for complete markets, perishable good, no habits
δ = 1, ε = 0, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.0438 0.0441 0.0454 0.0492
Re 0.0463 0.0467 0.0481 0.0521
Premium 0.25% 0.26% 0.27% 0.30%
δ = 1, ε = 0, b = 1.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0432
Re 0.0455 0.0456 0.0456 0.0457
Premium 0.25% 0.25% 0.25% 0.25%
δ = 1, ε = 0, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.0416 0.0412 0.0334 0.0279
Re 0.0440 0.0390 0.0352 0.0292
Premium 0.24% 0.22% 0.18% 0.13%
? Table A1 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed of two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2.
Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality. An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0.
Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
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Table A2: Returns for complete markets, durable good, no habits
δ = 0.94, ε = 0, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.1738 0.1758 0.1832 0.2052
Re 0.1765 0.1786 0.1861 0.2085
Premium 0.27% 0.28% 0.29% 0.33%
δ = 0.94, ε = 0, b = 1.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.1702 0.1702 0.1705 0.1710
Re 0.1728 0.1728 0.1731 0.1736
Premium 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26%
δ = 0.94, ε = 0, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.1630 0.1494 0.1206 0.0923
Re 0.1654 0.1516 0.1223 0.0936
Premium 0.24% 0.22% 0.17% 0.13%
? Table A2 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed of two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2.
Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality. An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0.
Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
Table A3: Two Classes, Complete Markets, Durable Goods: Equity Risk Premium, in %
h
δ 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9
1.00 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.30
0.90 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.35
0.60 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.57
0.30 0.65 0.67 0.72 0.90
0.10 0.83 0.85 0.92 1.15
0.06 0.87 0.89 0.97 1.22
? Table A3 shows results for the the equity risk premium Π (in %). The economy consists of two equal weighted social
classes, poor and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2. Parameter h is the coefficient of variation
and measures the degree of inequality. An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the
good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. A rate of 6% corresponds to the average depreciation rate observed from data.
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Table A4: Returns for complete markets, perishable good, external habits
δ = 1, ε = 0.1, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.0970 0.0973 0.0991 0.1024
Re 0.0995 0.0999 0.1018 0.1054
Premium 0.25% 0.25% 0.27% 0.30%
δ = 1, ε = 0.1, b = 1.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.0979 0.0979 0.0980 0.0979
Re 0.1005 0.1005 0.1006 0.1005
Premium 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26%
δ = 1, ε = 0.1, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.0999 0.0967 0.0903 0.0840
Re 0.1027 0.0993 0.0924 0.0856
Premium 0.28% 0.26% 0.21% 0.16%
? Table A4 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed of two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2.
Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality. An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0.
Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
Table A5: Two Classes, Complete Markets, External Habits: Equity Risk Premium, in %
h
ε 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9
0.10 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.31
0.30 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.29
0.60 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.26
0.90 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17
? Table A5 shows results for the equity risk premium Π (in %). The economy consists of two equal weighted social classes,
poor and rich. We show results only for agents that exhibit concave absolute risk tolerance, set at b = 0.5. The coefficient
of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2. Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality.
An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
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Table A6: Returns for complete markets, perishable good, internal habits, substitute con-
sumption
δ = 1, ε = −0.04, b = 0.5, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.1373 0.1385 0.1427 0.1550
Re 0.1400 0.1412 0.1455 0.1583
Premium 0.27% 0.27% 0.29% 0.32%
δ = 1, ε = −0.04, b = 1.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.1357 0.1357 0.1359 0.1361
Re 0.1383 0.1383 0.1385 0.1388
Premium 0.26% 0.26% 0.26% 0.26%
δ = 1, ε = −0.04, b = 2.0, r = 2.0
h 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Rf 0.1324 0.1245 0.1074 0.0916
Re 0.1349 0.1267 0.1091 0.0919
Premium 0.25% 0.23% 0.18% 0.13%
? Table A6 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed of two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2.
Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality. An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0.
Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
Table A7: Two Classes, Complete Markets, Internal Habits (substitutes): Equity Risk Pre-
mium, in %
h
ε 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9
-0.10 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.38
-0.30 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.57
-0.60 0.69 0.70 0.75 0.90
-0.90 0.99 1.01 1.09 1.36
? Table A7 shows results for the equity risk premium Π (in %). The economy consists of two equal weighted social classes,
poor and rich. We show results only for agents that exhibit concave absolute risk tolerance, set at b = 0.5. The coefficient
of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2. Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality.
An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
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Table A8: Returns for complete markets, three classes, durable good, no habits
δ = 1, ε = 0, r = 2.0
b 0.5 1 2
Rf 0.0757 0.0649 0.0369
Re 0.0791 0.0675 0.0374
Premium 0.35% 0.26% 0%
δ = 0.97, ε = 0, r = 2.0
b 0.5 1 2
Rf 0.1231 0.1305 0.0369
Re 0.1270 0.1331 0.0374
Premium 0.39% 0.26% 0%
δ = 0.94, ε = 0, r = 2.0
b 0.5 1 2
Rf 0.1506 0.1937 0.0576
Re 0.1551 0.1964 0.0580
Premium 0.45% 0.28% 0%
? Table A8 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed of three unequally weighted social classes, poor, middle and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set
at r = 2. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit
strength.
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Figure A1: The equity premium (in % per year) with three social classes and no habit formation. The perishable good is
represented by the blue line; the durable good (δ = 0.97) is represented by the red dashed line.
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Table A9: Returns for complete markets, three classes, perishable good, external habits
δ = 1, ε = 0, r = 2.0
b 0.5 1 2
Rf 0.0757 0.0649 0.0369
Re 0.0791 0.0675 0.0374
Premium 0.35% 0.26% 0%
δ = 1, ε = 0.01, r = 2.0
b 0.5 1 2
Rf 0.0699 0.0593 0.0351
Re 0.0734 0.0619 0.0355
Premium 0.35% 0.26% 0%
δ = 1, ε = 0.04, r = 2.0
b 0.5 1 2
Rf 0.0528 0.0858 0.0568
Re 0.0564 0.0884 0.0572
Premium 0.36% 0.26% 0%
? Table A9 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed of three unequally weighted social classes, poor, middle and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set
at r = 2. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit
strength.
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Figure A2: The equity premium (in % per year) with three social classes and external habits. The good is perishable
here. The non-habit economy is represented by the blue line. The economy with external habit persistence (ε = 0.04) is
represented by the red dashed line.
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Table A10: Returns for complete markets, three classes, perishable good, internal habits -
substitutes
δ = 1, ε = 0, r = 2.0
b 0.5 1 2
Rf 0.0757 0.0649 0.0369
Re 0.0791 0.0675 0.0374
Premium 0.35% 0.26% 0%
δ = 1, ε = −0.02, r = 2.0
b 0.5 1 2
Rf 0.1026 0.0962 0.0326
Re 0.1063 0.0988 0.0330
Premium 0.37% 0.26% 0%
δ = 1, ε = −0.04, r = 2.0
b 0.5 1 2
Rf 0.1214 0.1399 0.0636
Re 0.1255 0.1425 0.0637
Premium 0.41% 0.27% 0%
? Table A10 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed of three unequally weighted social classes, poor, middle and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set
at r = 2. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit
strength.
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Figure A3: The equity premium (in % per year) with three social classes and internal habits. The good is perishable
here. The non-habit economy is represented by the blue line. The economy with internal habit persistence (ε = −0.04) is
represented by the red dashed line.
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Table A11: Three Classes, Complete Markets: Equity Risk Premium, in %
Durability (δ) External Habits (ε) Internal Habits (−ε)
0.00 - 0.35 0.35
0.10 3.80 1.93 0.57
0.30 2.81 0.60 1.31
0.60 1.67 0.50 2.48
0.90 0.56 0.54 3.84
1.00 0.35 - -
? Table A11 shows results for the equity risk premium Π for different levels of durability and habit strength. We show results only for agents
that exhibit concave absolute risk tolerance, set at b = 0.5. The economy is composed by three unequally weighted social classes, poor, middle
and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is
perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
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Table A12: Returns for incomplete markets, no habits










? Table A12 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed of two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2.
Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality. An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0.
Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
Parameter k shows the intensity of the background risk.
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Figure A4: The equity premium (in % per year) as a function of the background risk. The economy consists of two equally
weighted classes of wealth (poor and rich). The plain (dashed) lines are for the egalitarian (unequal) economy. The blue
lines represent a perishable good; The red lines represent a durable good (δ = 0.94).
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Table A13: Returns for incomplete markets, external habits










? Table A13 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed of two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2.
Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality. An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0.
Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
Parameter k shows the intensity of the background risk.
85
Figure A5: The equity premium (in % per year) as a function of the background risk. The economy consists of two equally
weighted classes of wealth (poor and rich). The plain (dashed) lines are for the egalitarian (unequal) economy. The blue
lines represent a non-habit forming economy; The red lines represent an economy with external habit persistence (ε = 0.1).
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Table A14: Returns for incomplete markets, internal habits, substitutes










? Table A14 shows results for the return on equity Re, the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy
is composed of two equal weighted social classes, poor and rich. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2.
Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality. An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0.
Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
Parameter k shows the intensity of the background risk.
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Figure A6: The equity premium (in % per year) as a function of the background risk. The economy consists of two equally
weighted classes of wealth (poor and rich). The plain (dashed) lines are for the egalitarian (unequal) economy. The blue lines
represent a non-habit forming economy; The red lines represent an economy with internal habit persistence (ε = −0.04).
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Table A15: Two Classes, Incomplete Markets: Equity Risk Premium, in %
Durability (δ) External Habits (ε) Internal Habits (−ε)
0.00 - 0.2995 0.2995
0.10 0.5960 0.3102 0.3589
0.30 0.5312 0.3459 0.4629
0.60 0.4332 0.7959 0.5978
0.90 0.3335 0.2429 0.7191
1.00 0.2995 - -
? Table A15 shows results for the equity risk premium Π for different levels of durability and habit strength, when a background risk k = 0.25
is present. The economy is composed of two equally weighted social classes, poor and rich. Each poor (rich) is endowed with 50% (150%) of
the GDP per capita. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at r = 2. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the
good is perishable. Parameter ε shows the habit strength.
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B. Solving for the Equilibrium
B1. With External Habits










) = λiπs, i = 1, . . . n, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (C2)













B2. With Internal Habits
The First Order Conditions for the internal habit model are as follows:
q0u




′(Dis − xis)(−ε) = λiπ0, i = 1, . . . n, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (C4)
qsu
′(Dis − xis) = λiπs, i = 1, . . . n, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (C5)




, i = 1, . . . n, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (C6)
where
λi = q0u







An EZ Way to Evaluate Durable Assets
3.1 Introduction
The consumption-based asset pricing model (CCAPM) with the simple power utility spec-
ification fails to explain observed asset pricing puzzles, such as the high equity premium,
the high volatility of stock returns and the countercyclical variation in the equity premium
(Grossman and Shiller 1981; Shiller 1982; Mehra and Prescott 1985; Kandel and Stambaugh
1990). The assumption of time-additive utility, has the desirable property of scale invariance,
implying that interest rates and risk premia remain stationary even in a growing economy,
but has no real theoretical foundation. Furthermore, it is restrictive in that it links risk
aversion with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) making one the reciprocal of
the other and implies that the marginal utility of consumption at any date is independent
of consumption at all other dates.
Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) have emphasized a class of pref-
erences which disentagles the coefficient of risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS), providing a framework towards the resolution of the aforementioned asset
pricing anomalies. In particular, if the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) is set at
45 and the EIS at 0.1, then a reasonable match to the data (mean values) is obtained. But if
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a much more reasonable CRRA of 1 is hypothesized, the premium is a barely sufficient value
of 0.45% (Weil, 1989). Both of these features are counterfactual, as a very low value of EIS
implies implausible behavior of the risk-free rate. Generalizing preferences in the direction
of Epstein and Zin seems only to deepen the puzzle: in abstract economies such as Mehra
and Prescott’s (1985), there is insufficient consumption growth risk to justify a substantial
premium, unless agents are implausibly risk averse.
Moreover, most of the consumption-based asset pricing literature assumes that a representa-
tive investor’s marginal utility can be measured from the consumption of nondurable goods
and services. In these studies, utility is separable in the consumption of durables and non-
durables. With nonseparable utility however, one can also measure the stock of durable
goods and measure and calculate its influence on marginal utility (Dunn and Singleton,
1986; Eichenbaum and Hansen, 1990). Related literature explores the effect of durability on
the equilibrium risk free rate and the asset risk premia (Ferson and Constantinides, 1991;
Detemple and Giannikos, 1996; Yogo, 2006; Donaldson and Giannikos, 2003). Durable goods
put a wedge between expenditure (which takes places in one period) and consumption (over
multiple subsequent periods). durable goods provide services for a number of years. The
current marginal utility of these services may depend on the timing of the expenditure: it
will be greater if the durable good has been purchased recently and is thus in better condition
than an older durable good.
The objective of this paper is to examine the asset pricing implications of (i) the consumers’
wealth heterogeneity, (ii) the market structure, and (iii) the nature of the good, when the
agents exhibit Epstein-Zin preferences. We implement wealth inequality in a simple Arrow-
Debreu exchange economy with agents that live only two periods. A two-period model is
flexible and tractable and therefore, allows us to investigate equilibrium by using various
combinations of assumptions, despite its limitations. Wealth inequality is introduced with
a mean-preserving transfer of endowment. This creates the departure from an egalitarian
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distribution of wealth.
We start with the removal of the assumption that relative risk aversion is the reciprocal of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, as there is no strong evidence to support this
argument. Using a simple approximation of the wealth distribution in the U.S. economy
with two classes of wealth, we quantify the effect of wealth inequality on asset prices after
taking into account the disentanglement of risk and time aversion of agents.
Next, we relax the assumption that markets are complete, with the introduction of a back-
ground risk, defined as a risk that cannot be insured or avoided. Under some regularity
assumptions on preferences1, background risk makes investors less willing to take other forms
of risks, such as investment in risky financial assets. Researchers have identified sources of
background risk that cannot be fully diversified away because of market incompleteness or
illiquidity. Human capital (Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, 1992; Koo, 1995; Viceira, 2001;
Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005), housing wealth (Cocco, 2005; Flavin and Yamashita,
2002; Yao and Zhang, 2005) and private business wealth (Heaton and Lucas; 2000a, 2000b)
have been used to explain the reluctance of households to invest in risky financial markets.
Gollier (2006) argues that risk preferences might also be affected by limited access to credit
markets since it restricts the ability of households to transfer risk in time. Borrowing con-
straints make investors more risk averse in anticipation of the possibility that the constraint
might be binding in the future (Tepla, 2000). Finally, background risk might also be affected
by household size and composition, as the probability of divorce and the random liquidity
needs of a larger family with children might discourage financial risk taking (Love, 2010).
It becomes clear that the topic of background risk has a long history in macroeconomics
and finance. However, as it has been assessed by both theoretical and empirical models
of consumption and portfolio allocation (Gollier, 2001; Viceira, 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and
1Utility functions that are continuously differentiable with derivatives that alternate in sign have this
property (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987; Kimball, 1993; Eekhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger, 1996; Gollier and
Pratt, 1996).
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Maenhout, 2005; Polkovnichenko, 2007), background risk has been found to be relatively
small in size. As a consequence, this channel seems to have lost appeal as a quantitatively
important determinant of household portfolio choices or as a candidate explanation for asset
pricing puzzles.2
We demonstrate that when agents exhibit Epstein-Zin preferences, background risk may
in fact have a non-negligible effect on asset prices. What is more, we show that wealth
inequality can even decrease the risk premium, when risk aversion is disentangled from
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The change in risk premium depends on the
interaction of wealth inequality with agents’ preferences over resolution of uncertainty. It
seems that when agents have a stronger preference for resolution of uncertainty, durability
decreases the equity premium. On the other hand, when agents have a weaker preference
for resolution of uncertainty, durability increases the equity premium. We also show that
wealth inequality decreases the equity premium for certain levels of background risk and for
certain levels of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model and
methodology. Section 3 presents our data and calibrations, Section 4 discusses the numerical
results and Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Description of the economy
We consider a simple Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with a single durable good that sup-
plies a service. The good is characterized by a depreciation rate 0 6 δ 6 1, it is homogeneous
across agents, and it is exogenously determined. For δ = 1 the good becomes perishable.
2A recent empirical study by Fagereng et al. (2016) focuses on human capital as source of the background
risk and shows that its importance regarding portfolio heterogeneity varies greatly, as it is large for the poor
and negligible for the wealthy.
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The decay rate is one-hoss-shay3. There is a large number of n agents, i = 1, 2, ..., n in
the economy, who live for two periods, indexed by 0 and 1 respectively. To keep the model
simple, we assume that all agents have identical preferences, represented by the subjective
discount factor β. They also have the same attitude towards risk and consumption smoothing
over time. The economy is characterized by the von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function
u on consumption at each period, increasing (u′ > 0), twice continuously differentiable and
strictly concave (u′′ < 0).
We price the durable good with a spot contract. The law of motion of the durable good is
Ds = (1− δ)D0 + Cs, where Ds is the stock of durable good at state s and Cs are the units
of the durable good at state s. In the first period (no uncertainty) the good has D0 = C0
and in each subsequent state s = 1, ...s, ...S the good has Ds = (1− δ)D0 + Cs.
Wealth inequality is introduced through a mean preserving transfer of endowment. In the
first period there is no uncertainty and agent i receives an endowment equal to wi0. In the
second period there is uncertainty, characterized by S possible states of the world, indexed
by s = 0, 1, ...s, ...S and the agent receives a bundle of contingent claims wi1, ..., wis, ..., wiS
with associated probabilities p1, ...ps. This implies that the marginal utility of the good in






is not constant in s, i.e. the income per capita in state s is random.
3.2.2 Market Structure
Complete Markets: Assuming that markets are complete is equivalent to positing a num-
ber of contingent markets exactly equal to the number of contingent goods. We assume one
spot market for present consumption and S contingent markets for future consumption in the
3The durable good delivers the same services throughout its lifetime before failing with zero scrap value.
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S states of the world. Denote the competitive prices in the spot and in the futures markets
in the S different states of the world by π0 and πs respectively. We normalize π0 = 1, that is,
we assume that present consumption is the numeraire and therefore interpret the prices πs
in relative terms. In practice, πs is the price of a security that pays off 1 unit of consumption
only if state s occurs. That is, the payoff of this security is xs = 1, if s occurs. Denote with
bs the net purchase of these securities
4. If bs < 0, consumers sell securities rather than buy
(short sales).
The consumer’s problem is to maximize expected utility
U(Di0, Dis) = u(Di0) + Esu(Dis),
The budget constraints faced by the consumer are
Di0 = wi0 − Esπisbis
Di1 = wi1 + bi1
...
Dis = wis + bis
which give the intertemporal budget constraint
Di0 + EsDis = wi0 + Esπiswis








π0(Di0 − wi0) +
S∑
s=1
πs(Dis − wis) = 0, (3.2)
4Allowing for a risk-free bond in this context would be redundant, because a risk-free bond that pays off
1 unit of consumption in each state can be replicated by purchasing contingent bonds bs = 1.
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and
Dis = (1− δ)Di0 + Cis (3.3)
where Dis is the investor’s consumption. Let q0 = 1/β and qs = ps for s = 1, . . . s, . . . S.
The competitive equilibrium satisfies the following set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
q0u
′(Di0) = λiπ0, i = 1, . . . n
qsu
′(Dis) = λiπs, i = 1, . . . n, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (3.4)











wis, s = 0, . . . s, . . . S (3.5)
In this setting, the mutuality principle of Pareto efficient allocations holds and implies that
all diversifiable risks have been washed out of equilibrium.
Incomplete Markets: In the real world, markets are incomplete. Certain risks, by their
very nature, cannot be diversified. Aggregate risks, insofar, as they affect all pool members
equally, are fundamentally uninsurable. Furthermore, there may be different types of friction
preventing the realization of a complete market equilibrium: informational asymmetries or
problems in enforcing risk-sharing agreements. For instance, let us consider problems in-
volving private information. Models with complete markets posit that all individual shocks
are publicly observable, so anyone suffering a negative shock to income is compensated with
a positive transfer (and conversely for a positive shock). But if shocks are not observable,
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then every individual has the incentive to claim having been hit by a negative shock. At-
tanasio and Davis (1996) test the idea that private information prevents a complete market
equilibrium, by considering publicly observable shifts in the wage structure. According to
their findings, cohort-level consumption growth is strongly correlated with cohort-level wage
growth, which is considered a spectacular failure of the complete market hypothesis that
predicts no correlation. The failure of this hypothesis calls for studying models in which
consumption allocations are affected by uncertainty. It further implies that the representa-
tive agent framework is inappropriate for studying intertemporal consumption decisions.
We introduce an element of market incompleteness in the form of a non-hedgeable back-
ground risk. Agents faced with background risks respond by demanding insurance in the
form of options on the marketable risks. The agent’s wealth at time 1 is z+y, where y is the
background risk. This risk is idiosyncratic in the population of consumers. Utility is given
by v(z, x) = Eu(z + y, x), where a complete market exists for z, and y is a non-hedgeable
background risk. In this case, the amount an investor can consume depends not only on the
risky payoff, but also on the background risk. The background risk y is independent of the
market portfolio payoff z. Moreover, E(y) = 0 so that the non-hedgeable income is a pure
risk, with a non-positive mean. This background risk is also a time 1 measurable random
variable, denoted yi = σiki, where ki is a random variable with non-positive mean and unit
variance and σi is a constant measuring the size of the background risk. We also assume
that yi is bounded from below.
The consumer’s maximization problem now becomes
maxE{Ey[v( z + y)]} (3.6)
such that
E(z − z0)π = 0 (3.7)
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And the first order conditions are:
Ey[v
′( z + y)] = λπ (3.8)
3.2.3 Preferences
For our set of estimations, we use Epstein and Zin preferences (1989, 1991), building on the
work of Kreps and Porteus (1978). Recent work has made considerable progress in laying out
consistent specifications of asset price/consumption dynamics and preference specifications
(Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Hansen, Heaton, and Li, 2008). This particular class allows to
break the link between risk aversion and intertemporal substitution and hence, agents are
not indifferent to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty as the independence axiom
requires. They are defined as follows:
Ut = f(Dt, µ(Ut+1),
where f(.) is an aggregator function that evaluates the tradeoff between present and future,















where β is the subjective discount factor, r is the CRRA and 1
1−ρ is the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution (EIS), denoted as ψ. For r = 1/ψ, the recursion becomes linear.
When r > 1/ψ agents are more concerned about uncertainty than they are about pre-
dictable variation in consumption. They therefore prefer early resolution of uncertainty
about future consumption paths, because early resolution transforms uncertainty into pre-
dictable consumption variation. An agent with such a utility specification asks for a sizeable
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risk premium to compensate future uncertainty in the state economy. Epstein et al. (2014)
argue that for ψ equal to 1 or 1.5 and r equal to 7.5 or 10 (proposed by Bansal and Yaron;
2004) investors have unrealistically high willingness to pay for early resolution. Conversely,
for r < 1/ψ agents prefer late resolution of uncertainty. Most of the empirical literature
concentrates on the case where r > 1/ψ.
3.2.4 Asset Pricing
We now analyze the impact of wealth inequality on the equilibrium rate of return, the eq-
uity premium and the risk free rate. According to Weil’s (1989) calibrations, while the risk
free rate is estimated at 4% per year the observed risk free rate is around 1%. Mehra and
Prescott (1985) can explain an equity risk premium of, at most, 0.35%, while the observed
equity premium is 6%. Even with the disentanglement of risk aversion and elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution, the improvement of results can be characterized at best marginal5.
This discrepancy between theory and data raises several questions. A question we could
ask is which risk free rate we should use in order to discount costs and benefits of public
investment projects. The costs and benefits of most public policies are not spread equally
across citizens. Thus, it is interesting to study if wealth inequality can explain the difference
between theory and data, after the incorporation of durability and Epstein-Zin preferences
of agents.





′(zs). Risky assets and bonds have
payoff vectors Ge = (0, z1, z2, ..., zS) and G
b = (0, 1, 1, ..., 1) respectively. The relative price








The risk free asset provides one unit of consumption good at t = 1 with probability 1. The
5Weil (1989) obtains a scant equity premium of 0.45%, for a reasonable value of risk aversion equal to 1.
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where z0 is the current level of income per capita and z is the income per capita at the
maturity of the gross risk free rate.
3.3 Data and Calibrations
An analytical solution for the consumption function under uncertainty exists only with
quadratic utility or with exponential utility. In both cases, consumption is a linear function
of wealth, but both also imply rather implausible assumptions about preferences for risk. In
more realistic cases, there is no analytical solution. In particular, when the utility function
is of the CRRA type, the properties of the consumption function can be characterized only
by approximations or numerical simulations. The same applies if the utility function is of
the Epstein-Zin type. The simulation studies require parameters of the utility function and
of the income process. In the first generation of such studies, such as in Hubbard et al.
(1994), these parameters were either taken directly from outside sources or calibrated to fit
the distribution of consumption and wealth. Table 1 gathers all the parameters used in our
study, with a complete analysis following in the rest of this section.
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Table 1: Baseline Parameterization
Parameters Values
Probabilities
p1 Probability of realization of recession 61.756%
p2 Probability of realization of growth 38.244%
Wealth Distribution
h Coefficient of variation of wealth 0, 0.5
Individual Preference
β Time discount factor 0.99
δ Depreciation factor 0.3, 0.6, 0.9, 1
r Coefficient of relative risk aversion 2, 10
ψ Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 2
Income per capita
z0 Average income at period 0 1
z1 Average income at state 1 0.99
z2 Average income at state 2 1.0632
Endowment
w1s Endowment of poor agent at state s (1− h)zs
w2s Endowment of rich agent at state s (1 + h)zs
Background Risk
k Labor uninsurable income risk 0, 0.25
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GDP per capita: We consider a simple society in which every agent would be promised
the same share of the aggregate production in the future. This means that the risk borne
by every agent i is measured by the uncertainty affecting the growth of GDP per head.
All other risks are washed away by diversification. In the case of our model, we examine a
simple macroeconomic uncertainty. Period t = 1 consists of two states of the world. State
1 is defined as the recession state and state 2 is defined as the growth state. In state 1, the
consumption per capita is reduced by 1% (z1 = 0.99), with a probability of 61.756%. In
state 2 the consumption per capita is increased by 6.32% (z2 = 1.0632) with a probability
of 38.244%.
Return on non-durables, durables and bonds: Quarterly data for the growth rates
of durable and non-durable goods output is drawn from the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) for the period 1951-2016. Non-durable consumption is measured as the
sum of real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) on nondurable goods and services.
Nondurable goods are goods that have an average useful life of less than 3 years and include
food, clothing and shoes, housing, utilities, transportation, and medical care.
Durable goods have an average useful life of at least 3 years and consist of items such as
motor vehicles and parts, furnishings and durable household equipment, recreational goods
and vehicles, etc. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes year-end estimates of
the chained quantity index for the net stock of consumer durable goods. Using quarterly
data for real PCE on durable goods, we construct a quarterly series for the stock of durable
goods. Implicit in the data for the stock of durables are the depreciation rates used by the
BEA for various components of durable goods. The implied depreciation rate for durable
goods as a whole is approximately 6% per quarter. Following Yogo (2006), we use data since
1951, as the period immediately after the war is associated with unusually high durable
consumption growth due to the rapid restocking of durable goods.
Wealth Distribution: For our set of calibrations we consider a simple wealth distribution,
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with two equally weighted classes, poor and rich, as in Heaton and Lucas (1996) and Gollier
(2001). The poor are endowed with a share of 1−h of the GDP per capita in each state, and
the rich are endowed with the rest 1 + h. The parameter h is at the same time the standard
deviation and the coefficient of variation of the wealth distribution.
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution: The literature has not reached a consensus
about the magnitude of ψ. Hansen and SIngleton (1982), Guvenen (2009) and Vissin-
Jorgensen (2002) estimate ψ to be larger than 1; however, Barsky et al. (1997) and Campbell
(1999) provide estimates well below 1. Researchers of asset pricing also vary widely in their
choice of the value of ψ. For example, Bansal and Yaron (2004) take 1.5 for ψ, and Gomes
and Michaelides (2008) set (endogenous) stock market non-participants’ ψ to be 0.1 and
participants’ to be 0.3. On the other hand, Weil (1989) has shown that a very low value for
the EIS implies an implausible behavior of the risk-free rate. To acknowledge this diversity
of opinion, we choose a wide range of values for the ψ.
Background Risk: We quantify the effect of wealth inequality in an incomplete market
setting by introducing an uninsurable labor income risk. To keep things simple, we assume
that this background risk y is distributed as (−k, 1/2; +k, 1/2). Parameter k is the stan-
dard deviation of the growth of labor income. We obtain the equity premium as a function
of the size k of the uninsurable risk. Figure 1 reports the results of equity premium with
background risk in an egalitarian economy with a single perishable good. The agents exhibit
CRRA preferences. We observe that a very large background risk is required to explain the
equity premium puzzle, with a standard deviation of the annual growth of individual labor
income exceeding 70%. Our setting consists only of two periods, but Telmer (1993) obtained
similar conclusions in an infinite period framework. Given this result, in the next section
we will quantify the effect of background risk in an unequal economy when there is a single
durable good and the agents exhibit Epstein-Zin preferences. For the purpose of our study,
each agent will bear a fifty-fifty chance to win or lose k = 0.25.
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Figure 1: Equity premium with background risk in an egalitarian economy
3.4 Discussion of Results
The introduction of wealth inequality in an economy alters the aggregate demand in two
ways. First, poorer agents become more risk averse, hence they demand less risky assets.
On the other hand, wealthier people have a larger demand for equity, since they are more
tolerant to risk. Under linear risk tolerance the demand for risky assets is linear in wealth,
which implies that the two effects exactly compensate for each other, so that the aggregate
demand at the original equilibrium price is unaffected. But with increasing absolute risk
tolerance the effects do not wash out. As a result, the different wealth distributions have an
effect on the equilibrium asset prices.
In our paper, we incorporate durability of the good and Epstein-Zin preferences of agents to
show if the discrepancy between theory and empirics is still substantial. The introduction of
a durable good implies an effect of past purchases on current utility and choices. Durability
changes the structural form of asset risk premia. In particular, comparison of equilibria
across economies reveals that asset risk premia may be higher when the good is durable.
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The source of this effect is the non-separability of the past and present consumption of the
durable good.
In all cases, we analyze a society with two equally weighted classes of wealth, poor and
rich, and assume Epstein-Zin preferences of agents. The coefficient of relative risk aversion
(CRRA) is set as r and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is set as ψ and
takes a range of different values (from 0.05 to 2), so that we can account for both early and
late resolution of uncertainty. Parameter δ is the decay rate of the durable good and ranges
from 0 to 1. For δ = 1 the good becomes perishable. The relevant tables are reported in
Appendix 3.A.
3.4.1 Full Consumption Insurance
We start our analysis in fully insurable markets. In this setting, wealth inequality has no
effect on asset prices. Tables A1 and A2 report results for a perishable and a durable good
respectively. The coefficient of relative risk aversion r is set as 2 (Table A1) and 10 (Table
A2), which are reasonable in literature. For r = 1/psi we obtain results corresponding to the
simple power utility model. When r > 1/psi , agents have a preference over early resolution
of uncertainty and for r < 1/psi , agents have a preference over late resolution of uncertainty.
Starting with Table A1 we observe that the model is better calibrated when agents have a
risk aversion coefficient of 2 and prefer early resolution of uncertainty with ψ = 2 the risk
free rate (1.73%) and the equity risk premium (1.27%) than when agents have a preference
over late resolution of uncertainty (such as ψ equal to 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, etc.) . When ψ is 0.05 or
0.1, we get an unreasonably high risk-free rate and marginally increased equity risk premia
(0.34% and 0.28% respectively) comparing with the results of the power utility function
case (where r = 2 and ψ = 0.5). While an EIS as high as 1.5 is disputable, there is no
prevailing consensus estimate of this quantity, even as regards to its being greater, equal
to, or less than one (Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen 2007; Hall 1988; Guvenen 2006; Yogo
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2006). By increasing the r to 10 the risk free rate approaches its historically observed level,
as it becomes 1.1% and the equity risk premium increases to 1.85%, which is a non-marginal
change, although still far from explaining the equity premium puzzle.
Next, we introduce a single durable with a high depreciation rate δ = 0.97, as shown in
Table A2. The choice of our parameter is reasonable for a two-period model with a single
durable good.6 We observe that durability drives the equity premium down when agents
prefer early resolution of uncertainty and increases the equity premium when agents prefer
late resolution of uncertainty.
Table A3 and A4 report results of the equity risk premium for different depreciation rates of
the durable good, when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at 2 and 10 respectively.
When agents have a risk aversion coefficient set to 2, a lower depreciation rate increases the
equity risk premium for agents with late resolution of uncertainty preference (ψ is between
0.3, 0.5 and 0.7) and decreases the equity risk premium for agents with preference for early
resolution of uncertainty (ψ = 2). When agents have a risk aversion coefficient set to 10,
a lower depreciation rate increases the equity risk premium when agents have ψ between
0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, and decreases the equity risk premium when agents have ψ = 2. For a low
enough decay rate of the durable good, we are able to approach historically observed levels
with a reasonable CRRA value.
To summarize, when agents have a weaker preference for resolution of uncertainty, holding
a durable good will be compensated with a higher equity premium. On the other hand, if
agents have a stronger preference for resolution of uncertainty, holding a perishable good
will require a higher equity premium.
6Donaldson and Giannikos (2003) calibrate an infinite period model with two goods, a perishable and a
durable one, with lower depreciation rates.
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3.4.2 Background Risk
We continue our analysis by introducing a background risk in our model. This creates an
element of market incompleteness. In this setting, wealth inequality affects asset pricing. We
compare results for an egalitarian and an unequal economy. We have two classes of wealth
(poor and rich) of equal size. In the unequal economy, the poor are endowed with 50% of
the GDP per capita while the rich are endowed with 150% of the GDP per capita. Each
agent bears a lottery ticket with a 50-50 chance to win or lose k = 0.25. This simulates a
large risk on labor income. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at 2. Tables A5-A8
report results for the incomplete market setting.
Gollier (2001) shows that in a market with background risk and CRRA preferences, a de-
parture from an egalitarian economy improves the equity risk premium only marginally.
Our analysis provides a more surprising result, apparently unnoticed before; in a market
with background risk and Epstein-Zin preferences, a departure from the egalitarian economy
increases (reduces) the equity risk premium when agents prefer late (early) resolution of
uncertainty. Table A5 shows results for a perishable good. We observe that when agents
prefer late resolution of uncertainty, the lower the ψ, the higher the equity premium that is
obtained. However, for very low EIS, the risk free rates become unreasonably high. Table
A6 shows results for a durable good with a high depreciation rate (δ = 0.97). Durability
provides an improvement of the equity premium over a perishable good when agents have a
preference for late resolution of uncertainty and worsens the premium when agents have a
preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Also, we obtain historically observed levels of
the premium when agents have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty with ψ = 2.
Tables A7 and A8 report results of the equity premium for different depreciation rates,
when the economy is egalitarian and unequal respectively. When agents have a preference
over late resolution of uncertainty (ψ is 0.3 or 0.5), wealth inequality increases the equity
risk premium. When agents prefer early resolution of uncertainty (ψ is 0.7 or 2), wealth
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inequality decreases the equity risk premium.
Additionally, we generate Figures A1-A5 showing how the equity risk premium changes as a
function of background risk in both an egalitarian and an unequal economy. All agents have
a relative risk aversion coefficient equal to 2. Figure A1 refers to agents with preference over
early resolution of uncertainty (ψ = 2). The equity risk premium is higher for a durable good.
For very low income uncertainty (around 0-5%), wealth inequality increases the equity risk
premium. But when income uncertainty becomes 20-22%, wealth inequality starts reducing
the equity premium.
Figures A2-A5 refer to agents with preference over late resolution of uncertainty. The equity
risk premium is lower for a durable good. For ψ = 0.3 (Figure A2), wealth inequality
increases the equity premium for income uncertainty up to 22-23%, and decreases it for higher
income uncertainty. For ψ = 0.2 (Figure A3), wealth inequality increases the equity premium
for income uncertainty up to 18-20%, and decreases it for higher income uncertainty. For
ψ = 0.1 (Figure A4), wealth inequality increases the equity premium for income uncertainty
up to 5-10%, and decreases it for higher income uncertainty. Lastly, for ψ = 0.05 (Figure
A5), wealth inequality increases the equity premium for income uncertainty up to 10%, and
decreases it for higher income uncertainty. In Figure A5 (agents with very weak preference of
resolution of uncertainty) the equity premium reaches its highest levels for a large background
risk. Specifically, for a 35% income uncertainty, when agents invest in a perishable good, the
equity risk premium approaches 6%.
3.5 Conclusion
The present paper re-assesses the importance of Epstein-Zin preferences as an explanation for
agents’ reluctance to invest in risky assets. As long noticed in literature, standard Epstein-
Zin preferences do not necessarily go very far in resolving the equity premium puzzle, at least
not single-handendly. However, the incorporation of these preferences in an economy with a
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durable good can provide asset pricing results, not noticed before, when properly modeled.
Specifically, we examine the asset pricing implications of wealth inequality in a two-period
exchange economy with a single durable good, when agents exhibit Epstein-Zin preferences.
In our model, wealth inequality is introduced through a mean preserving transfer of endow-
ment. That creates the departure from an egalitarian economy. We generate results for both
fully insurable markets and markets with an uninsurable labor income risk.
In fully insurable markets wealth inequality has no effect on asset pricing. When agents have
a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, durability decreases the equity premium. On
the other hand, for agents with late preference for the resolution of uncertainty, a durable
good will increase the equity premium. We generate a risk free rate almost identical to its
historically observed levels for agents holding a perishable good, with risk aversion equal to
10 and elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to 2.
The present paper also re-assesses the importance of background risk as an explanation
for agents’ reluctance to invest in risky assets. Although labor income risk is a potential
important source of background risk and therefore a fundamental factor for understanding
portfolio choices and asset pricing, its role has been greatly diminished because empirically
its effects on portfolio allocation has been found to be too small to matter.
In a market with background risk, wealth inequality affects asset pricing. Our analysis
provides a surprising result; when agents exhibit Epstein-Zin preferences, a departure from
the egalitarian economy can reduce the equity risk premium, as long as agents prefer early
resolution of uncertainty. While Gollier (2001) showed that in an exchange economy with
a background risk and CRRA preferences, wealth inequality increases marginally the equity
risk premium, we show that converting to Epstein-Zin preferences we have non-marginal




Table A1: Returns for complete markets, perishable good
δ = 1, k = 0, r = 2
ψ 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
Rf (%) 40.71 19.15 9.64 6.64 4.30 3.32 1.73
Premium (%) 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.27
δ = 1, k = 0, r = 10
ψ 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
Rf (%) 28.16 13.49 6.79 4.65 2.97 2.25 1.10
Premium (%) 1.39 1.23 1.16 1.14 1.12 1.11 1.85
? Table A1 shows results for the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. Wealth inequality has no effect on asset
pricing in this setting. Parameter r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and k the background risk. Parameter δ is the
depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Table A2: Returns for complete markets, durable good
δ = 0.97, k = 0, r = 2
ψ 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
Rf (%) 151.89 59.42 26.83 17.52 10.56 7.71 3.23
Premium (%) 0.58 0.37 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24
δ = 0.97, k = 0, r = 10
ψ 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
Rf (%) 130.57 52.24 23.70 15.43 9.22 6.67 2.63
Premium (%) 2.45 1.62 1.31 1.22 1.16 1.13 1.09
? Table A2 shows results for the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. Wealth inequality has no effect on asset
pricing in this setting. Parameter r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and k the background risk. Parameter δ is the
depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
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Table A3: Complete Markets, r=2, Durable Good: Equity Risk Premium, in %
ψ
δ 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
1.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.27
0.90 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.23
0.60 0.56 0.35 0.29 0.21
0.30 0.87 0.42 0.31 0.19
? Table A3 shows results for the the equity risk premium Π (in %). Wealth inequality has no effect on asset pricing in this
setting. Parameter r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and k the background risk. Parameter δ is the depreciation
rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Table A4: Complete Markets, r=10, Durable Good: Equity Risk Premium, in %
ψ
δ 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
1.00 1.14 1.12 1.11 1.85
0.90 1.44 1.25 1.18 1.06
0.60 2.59 1.63 1.34 0.97
0.30 4.13 2.02 1.48 0.95
? Table A4 shows results for the the equity risk premium Π (in %). Wealth inequality has no effect on asset pricing in this
setting. Parameter r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and k the background risk. Parameter δ is the depreciation
rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
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Table A5: Returns for incomplete markets, perishable good
h = 0, δ = 1, k = 0.25, r = 2
ψ 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
Rf (%) 5,877.46 436.27 71.56 25.78 4.84 -0.49 -4.80
Premium (%) 16.80 1.51 0.48 0.35 0.30 3.93 9.34
h = 0.5, δ = 1, k = 0.25, r = 2
ψ 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
Rf (%) 3,222.53 314.06 60.29 23.52 4.90 0.68 -4.66
Premium (%) 9.51 1.18 0.46 0.35 0.30 2.52 9.06
? Table A5 shows results for the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy is composed of two equal
weighted social classes, poor and rich. Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality.
An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0. Parameter r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and k the background
risk. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ψ is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.
Table A6: Returns for incomplete markets, durable good
h = 0, δ = 0.97, k = 0.25, r = 2
ψ 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
Rf (%) 11,451.50 646.76 102.79 40.77 12.32 4.63 -2.90
Premium (%) 31.29 2.02 0.55 0.38 0.31 0.29 6.83
h = 0.5, δ = 0.97, k = 0.25, r = 2
ψ 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
Rf (%) 6,440.69 480.84 90.28 38.60 12.51 4.89 -2.79
Premium (%) 18.06 1.60 0.52 0.38 0.31 0.29 6.70
? Table A6 shows results for the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy is composed of two equal
weighted social classes, poor and rich. Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality.
An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0. Parameter r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and k the background
risk. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ψ is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.
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Table A7: Incomplete Markets, k=0.25, r=2, h=0, Durable Good: Equity Risk Premium,
in %
ψ
δ 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
1.00 0.35 0.29 3.93 9.34
0.90 0.45 0.33 0.29 1.72
0.60 0.82 0.42 0.32 0.22
? Table A7 shows results for the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy is composed of two equal
weighted social classes, poor and rich. Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality.
An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0. Parameter r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and k the background
risk. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ψ is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.
Table A8: Incomplete Markets, k=0.25, r=2, h=0.5, Durable Good: Equity Risk Premium,
in %
ψ
δ 0.3 0.5 0.7 2
1.00 0.35 0.30 2.52 9.06
0.90 0.45 0.33 0.29 1.64
0.60 0.84 0.44 0.32 0.20
? Table A8 shows results for the risk free rate Rf and the equity risk premium Π. The economy is composed of two equal
weighted social classes, poor and rich. Parameter h is the coefficient of variation and measures the degree of inequality.
An egalitarian economy is set at h = 0. Parameter r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and k the background
risk. Parameter δ is the depreciation rate of the good. For δ = 1 the good is perishable. Parameter ψ is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.
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Figure A1: The equity premium (in % per year) as a function of the background risk. The economy consists of two equally
weighted classes of wealth (poor and rich). The plain (dashed) lines are for the egalitarian (unequal) economy. The blue
lines represent an economy with a perishable good; The red lines represent an economy with a durable good (δ = 0.97). The
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ) is set at 2.
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Figure A2: The equity premium (in % per year) as a function of the background risk. The economy consists of two equally
weighted classes of wealth (poor and rich). The plain (dashed) lines are for the egalitarian (unequal) economy. The blue
lines represent an economy with a perishable good; The red lines represent an economy with a durable good (δ = 0.97). The
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ) is set at 0.3.
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Figure A3: The equity premium (in % per year) as a function of the background risk. The economy consists of two equally
weighted classes of wealth (poor and rich). The plain (dashed) lines are for the egalitarian (unequal) economy. The blue
lines represent an economy with a perishable good; The red lines represent an economy with a durable good (δ = 0.97). The
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ) is set at 0.2.
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Figure A4: The equity premium (in % per year) as a function of the background risk. The economy consists of two equally
weighted classes of wealth (poor and rich). The plain (dashed) lines are for the egalitarian (unequal) economy. The blue
lines represent an economy with a perishable good; The red lines represent an economy with a durable good (δ = 0.97). The
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ) is set at 0.1.
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Figure A5: The equity premium (in % per year) as a function of the background risk. The economy consists of two equally
weighted classes of wealth (poor and rich). The plain (dashed) lines are for the egalitarian (unequal) economy. The blue
lines represent an economy with a perishable good; The red lines represent an economy with a durable good (δ = 0.97). The
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ) is set at 0.05.
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B. Solving for the Equilibrium












































For our numerical computations, we create a simple algorithm for a two-period exchange economy, with two







































π0(Ci0 − wi0) + π1(Ci1 − wi1) + π2(Ci2 − wi2)
}
We obtain the following equations by manipulating the First Order Conditions
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1−r + (C22 − k)1−r
}) p1−r ]1−pp
= λ2π2
The market clearing conditions are
C10 + C20 = w10 + w20
C11 + C21 = w11 + w21
C12 + C22 = w12 + w22
The problem should satisfy also the budget constraint
π0(C10 − w10) + π1(C11 − w11) + π2(C12 − w12) = 0
After solving the above system of equations, we evaluate the marginal utilities:
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It is easy now to determine π1, π2, Π and R.
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